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ABSTRACT 
De-radicalization programs for captured jihadi fighters have had mixed success in the 
Arab world.  The Saudi Arabian and U.S. effort in Iraq serve as examples of effective de-
radicalization programs, while the Yemeni program serves as an example of what not to 
do.  In this thesis, we find that the successful programs utilize a combination of proper 
assessment, informed segregation of the participants, and rehabilitation. The assessment 
process enables programs to better focus their resources on individuals who can be de-
radicalized while screening out those who cannot be de-radicalized under current 
conditions.  Once assessed, segregation minimizes detainee networking, and further 
recruitment and radicalization.  Finally, rehabilitation provides a detainee the proper 
resources and support necessary to allow reintegration into society.  By utilizing the 
knowledge of what characterizes an effective de-radicalization effort, the United States 
and its allies will have additional means to combat radical Islam and prevent further acts 
of terror.      
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I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE  
Immediately following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States and 
the rest of the Western world began formulating strategies to respond to the new face of 
terrorism.  The wide range of measures that were developed served primarily to destroy 
terrorism rather than undermine its appeal.  However, this approach has proved to be 
more difficult than was first anticipated.  As General David Petraeus, then head of the 
U.S. Central Command, noted, the United States “cannot kill its way to victory.”1  This 
realization led to a shift towards understanding and dealing with the question of why 
individuals become terrorists.  In addition, as prisons began to fill with terror suspects, 
the prisons themselves became breeding grounds for more radicalization and recruitment.  
To counter this trend, several nations implemented programs to reduce militancy, change 
attitudes, counter ideology, and eventually integrate former terrorists back into society. 
Because of the current ideological conflict, the United States needs to become far 
more sophisticated in its understanding of Islam and in the categorization of Islam’s 
radical elements.  This understanding may lead to more effective ways of dealing with 
radical groups and individuals.  The ultimate goal is to decrease the number of terrorists 
and number of terrorist attacks.  De-radicalization programs designed to alter the 
behavior and ideology of extremists can do precisely this.  These programs are intended 
to disengage, reeducate, and de-radicalize extremists.  Unfortunately, relatively little 
systematic analysis has been done on de-radicalization programs.  Many countries that 
have de-radicalization programs have detailed descriptions of their program; however, 
they lack analytical frameworks and measurable data to effectively evaluate the 




                                                 
1 Jessica Stern, "Mind Over Martyr," Foreign Affairs 89, no. 1 (January 2010), 95–108. 
2 Tore Bjorgo et al., eds., Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement (New 
York: Routledge, 2008), 307. 
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How are these programs structured?  Whom do they target?  How is effectiveness 
measured?  What can the United States government and our allies learn from these 
programs?  
Using Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs theory to examine de-radicalization 
programs, we illustrate effective components of each program and suggest ways these 
same components can be applied in different settings.  We propose that proper 
assessment of the individual and an understanding of the environment they will return to 
upon release, coupled with a program capable of providing for the individual’s needs, 
determine the effectiveness of a de-radicalization effort.   
The thesis evaluates three de-radicalization programs using Maslow’s framework.  
First, we examine the Yemeni Religious Dialogue Committee, which was one of the first 
de-radicalization programs implemented; Saudi Arabia’s Counseling Program, one of the 
best-funded and well-known programs in existence; and the U.S. efforts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, which represent the most current and promising de-radicalization programs.   
For the U.S. program, we interviewed several U.S. military officers involved with 
creating and implementing the program, including the program’s architect, Maj. Gen 
Stone.  
After examining the Yemeni, Saudi Arabian, and U.S. de-radicalization efforts, 
several findings became evident. These findings included the importance of assessment, 
the need for segregation, and a focus on rehabilitation versus retribution.  The assessment 
process enables a program to better focus resources on individuals who can be de-
radicalized while screening out those who cannot be de-radicalized under current 
conditions.  Once proper assessments are conducted, effective segregation of hard-core 
radicals from more moderate prisoners can be accomplished, thereby creating a safer 
environment and reducing the chance for further radicalization or recruitment.  Finally, a 
focus on rehabilitation versus retribution is a more successful means to eventually 
reintegrate detained individuals back into society.  
The thesis proceeds as follows.  Chapter II discusses some of the origins of 
terrorism and reasons why individuals may become radicalized.  It identifies key areas 
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that must be addressed in order to effectively de-radicalize an individual.  The chapter 
then introduces a framework based on Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Theory, which 
includes actions to effectively de-radicalize an individual.   
Chapter III examines how radical groups entice individuals into playing active 
parts in furthering the group’s cause.  This chapter asserts that there is more than one path 
to radicalization.  Understanding these different paths offers insight into the most 
effective methods to de-radicalize an individual. 
Chapter IV investigates Yemen’s Religious Dialogue Committee.  Yemen was 
one of the first states to utilize a de-radicalization component in its counter-terrorism 
strategy, yet its program ended in failure in 2005. Our framework is used to analyze why 
the Yemeni program did not succeed.  
Chapter V analyzes the Saudi Counseling Program, which was created after a 
series of deadly domestic terrorist attacks in the kingdom in 2003.  This chapter examines 
the program’s background history, organization, structure, and process for de-
radicalization.  
Chapter VI examines the United States’ de-radicalization efforts in its Theater 
Internment Facilities (TIF) in Iraq and Afghanistan, a new program initiated by Major 
General Douglas Stone following the failures that led to the Abu Ghraib scandal.   
Chapter VII offers concluding thoughts on the effectiveness of the de-
radicalization programs studied.  Findings include the importance of assessment, the need 
for segregation, and a focus on rehabilitation rather than retribution.  Finally, we offer 
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II. ORIGINS OF TERRORISM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we will discuss some of the origins of terrorism and reasons why 
individuals may become radicalized.  In turn, we then identify key areas that must be 
addressed in order to effectively de-radicalize an individual.  We present a framework 
based on Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Theory to systematically analyze the specific 
needs that must be addressed in order to understand the different motivations for 
radicalization and how to counter these motives and de-radicalize an individual.  
Critiques of Maslow’s Theory are also incorporated to show that the theory does in fact 
provide a solid foundation to analyze the success of a de-radicalization program.  Using 
Maslow’s theory, we produce a specific framework that includes ingredients to 
effectively de-radicalize an individual.  The chapter concludes with a discussion our 
methodology and an in-depth examination of each level of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs.  
B. MOTIVATIONS: THE PATH TO RADICALIZATION 
Terrorist acts are carried out by individuals who are driven to take action due to 
many different motivations.  Existing explanations for terrorism point to a long list of 
issues such poverty, ideology, identity, or a lack of democracy and political freedom as 
possible causes.  The emergence of terrorism, however, cannot be narrowed down to one 
single cause.  Therefore, a framework that covers a broad range of issues must be used to 
analyze its development.  Also, most theories describe the terrorist’s environment without 
fully describing the individual’s motivations; individual motivations play an extremely 
important part in the decision-making process of a person who has become radicalized.  
We argue that satisfying these same motivations is the key to de-radicalizing a person 
once they have been radicalized    
When it comes to describing individual motivations, Abraham Maslow captures 
the essence of the issue in a 1943 paper entitled A Theory of Human Motivation.  His 
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fundamental yet operationally elegant theory offers a time-tested explanation as to why 
people act in certain ways across a range of cultures and environments. 
 
Figure 2-1.  Maslow Hierarchy of Needs3  
As seen in the Figure 2-1, Maslow defines the most basic needs of humans as 
physiological needs.  These physiological needs compose the lowest level required for 
human survival and include breathing, food, sexual activity, and the maintenance of 
homeostasis.  Humans continually strive to maintain homeostasis consisting of both 
psychological consistency and physiological stability.  Breathing, drinking, eating, 
sleeping and excreting are essential in maintaining physical homeostasis. Just as 
important, behaviors that seek to satisfy these physiological needs supply a sense of 
predictability and balance for people.  These needs and the corresponding requirement to 
fulfill these needs are not separate from the person, as the entire person is motivated to 
fill the need, not just a part of him.  As illustrated by Maslow, “the whole individual is 
motivated rather than just part of him… It is John Smith who wants food, not John 
Smith’s stomach… Food satisfies John Smith’s hunger, not John Smith’s stomach’s 
hunger.”4 Physiological needs are different from other needs since they generally tend to 
take over human behavior until they are fulfilled to a basic degree.   
                                                 
3 Abraham Maslow,  "A Theory of Human Motivation," 1943, York University. 370. 
4  Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," 370.  
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Once physiological needs are quenched, the need for safety rises to become the 
primary motivation in human behavior. As defined by Maslow, the security of the body, 
employment, resources, morality, family, health and property make up the needs for 
safety.5    Furthermore, safety needs entail the desire for predictability and order, where 
unfamiliar and unexpected events are the exception rather than the rule.  When a person’s 
safety is threatened, he or she becomes increasingly focused on restoring a refuge, and 
even more focused on avoiding danger.  In many cases, even intense physiological needs 
are overcome by the overwhelming desire to maintain safety and security.  As an 
example, a person may have an intense desire to eat while driving through a questionable 
area of a city.  Even though that person is extremely hungry, they are unwilling to 
compromise the need for safety for the immediate satisfaction of quenching the physical 
discomfort caused by hunger or thirst.6   Just like physiological needs, safety needs cease 
to dominate behavior when they are continually satisfied and give way to other needs, 
such as the need for love and belongingness.   
With the advent of modern technology and developed societies that typically 
satisfy the lower physiological and safety needs, social needs tend to create the largest 
void in society.  Social needs involve feelings of belongingness, consisting of friendship, 
family, and sexual intimacy.7  Seeking significance and bonds with other people 
represents the foundation of social needs. An assortment of different types of 
relationships is required to fully gratify the social needs.  The need to fulfill these needs 
comes from the primitive existence of humans as pack animals who were dependant on 
the tribe or clan for survival.  Although humans have evolved and technology has 
diminished the requirement to live in packs in order to survive, the need for 
belongingness still dominates human behavior.  Perhaps, even more so today than in 
prehistoric times, people are driven to be part of something or some group larger than  
 
 
                                                 
5 Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” 370. 
6 A. R. Reid-Cunningham, "Maslow’s Theory of Motivation and Hierarchy of Human Needs: A 
Critical Analysis" (Doctorate, University of California - Berkeley). 
7 Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 1. 
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themselves as evident in the continuation of marriages, clubs, teams, and even society at 
large.   Inside these groups, the need for self-esteem tends to rise which leads directly to 
the next level of motivation.  
As social needs are met, the desire for esteem increases or, as Maslow describes, 
esteem presents the normal human desire to be accepted and valued by others.8   People 
in a society generally wish for others to think highly of them and want to be viewed with 
esteem rather than contempt.   Humans also want to think of themselves as worthy of 
esteem through an accurate estimation of self-worth and value.  The development of self-
esteem leads to feelings of confidence, strength, worth, and capability to continue to meet 
lower level needs.   Humans who satisfy their esteem needs tend to be more productive 
and well adjusted to fitting in with society.  Evidence suggests that upsetting self-esteem 
needs can result in psychopathic behavior, insecurity, feelings of helplessness, and 
feelings of inferiority.  Maslow argues that those who do not have their esteem needs met 
tend to withdraw to the fringes of society and become increasingly discouraged.    
The final and arguably the most controversial level of needs is self-actualization, 
which ensures a person is capable of meeting their full potential.  As defined by Maslow, 
self-actualization means achieving morality, creativity, spontaneity, problem solving, 
lack of prejudice, and acceptance of facts.  Edward Hoffman, in The Right to be Human: 
A Biography of Abraham Maslow, succinctly described the premise of self-actualization, 
“In the core of our being we each carry the seed of our becoming, of our latent 
potential.”9  However, Maslow’s self-actualization research forms the premise that “each 
of us harbors an innate human nature of vast potential that usually becomes blocked or 
thwarted through the deprivation of lower needs.”10  Maslow describes a case where a 
promising former student had graduated with a bachelor’s degree only to take a dull yet 
secure job during the Great Depression in order to fulfill her family’s basic needs.  As 
Maslow reflects, “she was not using her intelligence” and “this might be a major reason 
                                                 
8 Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 1. 
9 Edward Hoffman, The Right to be Human: A Biography of Abraham Maslow (Los Angeles: Jeremy 
B. Tarcher Inc, 1988), 254. 
10 Hoffman, The Right to be Human, 156. 
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for her boredom with…the normal pleasures of life.”11  Maslow counseled the former 
student to enroll in graduate studies during her time off.  Once the former student heeded 
his advice she “became more alive, more happy and zestful, and most of her physical 
symptoms had disappeared.”12  
In order to truly understand Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs and address the 
criticisms of the theory, the five basic assumptions that were influential in the 
establishment of the theory must be understood.  The first assumption is that the complete 
person is motivated to action: this assumption requires a holistic approach to 
understanding motivations.  Secondly, motivations are normally multifaceted and require 
a number of sources of satisfaction or dissatisfaction before corresponding actions occur.  
Motivations maybe conscious, such as the desire for water to quench an unrelenting 
thirst, or unconscious, such as using a cell phone as a way to feel connected to a loved 
one while driving.  The third assumption is that people are constantly motivated by their 
requirement to fulfill their needs and the satisfaction of one need creates the desire to fill 
other less fulfilled needs.  The forth assumption is that humans across the world are 
motivated to fill the same basic needs although they may realize satisfaction in different 
culturally defined forms.  The fifth and final assumption claims that needs can be 
arranged in a hierarchy, where fundamental needs must be satisfied before attention can 
be given to higher-level needs.13 
C. CRITICISMS OF MASLOW’S THEORY 
Abraham Maslow was open to criticism of his theory and even invited critiques 
when he wrote, “My fellow scientists can proceed with less passion, personal 
involvement, and heat—in the cool manner of science—to check whether I was right or 
not.”14 Almost seventy years since its formulation, Maslow’s Theory of Motivations has 
held up to criticism by clinical practitioners, social scientist, and even an onslaught of 
                                                 
11 Edward Hoffman, ed., Future Visions: The Unpublished Papers of Abraham Maslow. (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Inc., 1996).  
12 Hoffman, The Right to be Human: A Biography of Abraham Maslow, 145. 
13 Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 1. 
14 Hoffman, Future Visions: The Unpublished Papers of Abraham Maslow, 30. 
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armchair philosophers.15 The three main criticisms of Maslow’s theory are discussed 
below.   
The first criticism is centered on the argument of “The Chronically Hungry 
Person.”  These critics make the argument that, according to Maslow’s own illustration, a 
chronically hungry person would crave food above all other needs and would have no 
other motivation other than that of finding food.  As the critics point out, Maslow’s 
theory assumes that values such as community, freedom, and even love may be set aside 
or as Maslow stated “waved aside as fripperies which are useless since they fail to fill the 
stomach.”16 Taking this criticism one step further, to the chronically hungry person a 
utopia would be simply a place with an abundance of food.  As with many of the other 
criticisms, this overly simplified explanation does not take into account an assortment of 
factors that are constantly interacting at different levels.17   
These critics tend to overlook Maslow’s statement concerning a starving person, 
“as soon as he is able to provide for his physiological needs, he will no longer trade his 
self-respect for food.”18  Maslow also understood that people who are accustomed to 
prolonged hunger are able to withstand a scarcity of food better than those who have 
plenty and then find themselves without.  Furthermore, Maslow acknowledges his theory 
may not explain well individuals with psychological disorders: his theory was meant for 
the general population.  Just as the hungry man example over exaggerates, many other 
critics use extreme cases to define an argument against Maslow’s theory by creating 
lopsided arguments based off of observations in extreme circumstances.  Recognizing 
this potential problem, Maslow criticized theories that rest solely on observations taken 
under unusual conditions by noting, “behavior during extreme physiological deprivation 
is certainly being blind to many things.”19  He favored instead observations based under 
                                                 
15 Reid-Cunningham, Maslow’s Theory of Motivation and Hierarchy of Human Needs: A Critical 
Analysis. 
16 Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 1. 
17 Reid-Cunningham, Maslow’s Theory of Motivation and Hierarchy of Human Needs: A Critical 
Analysis. 
18 Hoffman, The Right to be Human: A Biography of Abraham Maslow, 154. 
19 Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 1. 
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more typical circumstances to better understand general human behavior and not those 
distorted by the extremes.20   
The second criticism concerns the methodological limitations of Maslow’s theory.  
Since many of the motivations presented by Maslow occur at the subconscious level of 
thought, it is extremely difficult to accurately report or rank motivations about which a 
person is consciously unaware.  Furthermore, critics point out that some conscious 
desires may be in direct conflict with motivations that are occurring simultaneously in the 
subconscious.  Maslow attempted to overcome this obstacle by using both self-reporting 
and direct observation of behavior to reinforce or refute the cause of motivations.   Since 
the development of Maslow’s theory, several studies have been undertaken to attempt to 
bring more clarity to motivation theory.  Most of the studies, however, were not designed 
to account for multi-motivated behavior.  Another problem with recent studies is that they 
tend to use a group as a unit of analysis when Maslow’s theory was derived using the 
individual as the unit of analysis.  Even so, some studies tend to reinforce Maslow’s 
theory, but others have resulted in contradictory results.  Until more concise methodology 
can be created, the best test for Maslow’s Motivation Theory remains testing and refining 
his theory under the conditions he created in the theory.21   
The third and probably most relevant criticism of Maslow, as it concerns our 
application to de-radicalization, is cultural relativity and universal application of 
motivations across cultures.  Many critics of Maslow contend that people of other 
cultures have different values and therefore no universal human needs theory could ever 
predict the nuisances of different cultures.  Early in his career, Maslow too shared these 
views but his opinion changed when he undertook anthropological fieldwork, studying 
the Blackfoot Indians.22  Maslow used this experience to shape the view that fundamental 
desires of all human beings do not vary as widely as everyday conscious desires that are 
more dependent on circumstances and culture.  Even so, he was well aware that his 
                                                 
20 Reid-Cunningham,  Maslow’s Theory of Motivation and Hierarchy of Human Needs: A Critical 
Analysis. 
21 Reid-Cunningham,  Maslow’s Theory of Motivation and Hierarchy of Human Needs: A Critical 
Analysis. 
22 Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 1. 
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theory was not a one size fits all solution for all cultures: “no claim is made that it is 
ultimate or universal for all cultures.”23  Instead, he balanced an overwhelming logic of 
universalism concerned with basic human needs, with a firm acceptance of how social 
experiences, coupled with culture, would shape the needs and eventual actions stemming 
from human motivations.  As Maslow understood, “Certain drives there are, and satisfied 
they will be in one way or another, regardless of the governmental, economic, and social 
taboos extant at the time.”24  
Understanding that Maslow’s Theory of Motivation, while commonly applied to 
broad populations, may not be entirely universally useful or valid in this context. In order 
to answer group motivation, it is necessary to create a model that is flexible enough to 
take cultural factors into account while maintaining broad applicability to the human 
condition.25 
D. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In the course of our study, we examine programs that aim to de-radicalize an 
individual.  Specifically, we look at Islamically motivated terrorists.  De-radicalization 
has two end goals: produce a repentant individual, and contribute to a reduction in 
ideological support for the terrorist organization’s cause.  As we dive into the de-
radicalization process, several intervening variables are important for understanding 
individual motivations for joining and leaving terrorists groups.  The first is the level of 
involvement of a terrorist.  Was the terrorist a lower echelon participant, a key 
planner/organizer for the cause, or does the terrorist actually have blood on their hands?  
The second is the detainee’s religious education level.  Is the detainee an illiterate person 
who relies on others to understand Islam, a well-educated religious scholar, or maybe 
somewhere in between these two extremes? Third, an assessment of the predicted 
economic conditions of the detainee upon release must also be examined.  Is the economy 
                                                 
23 Hoffman, The Right to be Human: A Biography of Abraham Maslow, 73. 
24 Hoffman, The Right to be Human: A Biography of Abraham Maslow, 73. 
25 Reid-Cunningham,  Maslow’s Theory of Motivation and Hierarchy of Human Needs: A Critical 
Analysis. 
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going to be such that the detained person can use the skills and knowledge gained during 
the de-radicalization process to make a new life, or will he return to a situation where he 
still is unable to find employment?  
The sponsor of the de-radicalization program, which is usually a country’s 
government, must effectively evaluate the individual based on these variables along with 
an assessment of his motivations for joining the radical element in the first place.  An 
effective evaluation will determine at what motivation level the de-radicalization program 
will focus on and whether or not the detainee could be de-radicalized within the means of 
the existing program.  The relationship is shown in the following figures.   
 
 
Figure 2-2.  Theoretical Framework 
As seen in Figure 2-2, a captured terrorist is placed in the de-radicalization 
program.  Immediately the first two intervening variables must be assessed: the level of 
the detainee’s involvement in the organization, and the level of the detainee’s education.  
Figure 2-3 describes this relationship. 
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Figure 2-3. Religious Education and Level of Terrorist Involvement 
If, for example, a captured individual has a low religious education level and had 
a low level of involvement inside of the terrorist organization, one would have to satisfy a 
lower amount of motivational needs to de-radicalize that individual.  On the other 
extreme, if that person had a high education level and had a high level of involvement in 
the group, a de-radicalization program would need to address a greater number, probably 
all of their motivational needs.   
The next intervening variable to investigate is the predicted environmental and 
economic conditions the detainee would face when released from the program.  Figure 2-
4 illustrates this relationship. 
 
 
Figure 2-4. Environmental and Economic Conditions Upon Release 
After an individual is capture and placed in the program, a predictive estimate 
must be made as to what the status of their terrorist group will be.  Is the terrorist group 
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on the edge of extinction or is the group on the rise and expected to be even more virulent 
upon the detainee’s release?  Likewise, what is the predicted economic condition in their 
country will be in upon their release.  Figure 2-4 shows that, if the individual’s 
organization is no longer active and the economy is doing well, a lower degree of their 
motivational needs will need to be met.  However, if their organization is still active and 
the economy is bad, once again a greater number of the individual’s motivational needs 
must be met by the government.  An additional option here would be to keep this 
individual detained until one or both of these variables change.   
The results are seen in the dependent variable, program effectiveness, which is 
measured by the individual’s needs being both properly assessed and properly met.  This 
relationship is shown in Figure 2-5. 
 
 
Figure 2-5. Program Effectiveness 
Figure 2-5 illustrates that if the individual and post-incarceration conditions are 
properly assessed when an individual is placed in the de-radicalization program and if 
their motivational needs are properly met, the program effectiveness will be high and the 
individual should be de-radicalized.  Conversely, if the individual and post-incarceration 
conditions were not properly assessed and or their motivational needs were not met, the 
program will not be effective.    
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E. METHODOLOGY 
It is our hypothesis that how well a program provides for Maslow’s hierarchy of 
needs determines the outcome of the program.  Specifically, proper assessment of an 
individual’s needs and an understanding the environment they will return to upon release, 
coupled with a program capable of providing for those needs, will determine the 
effectiveness of a de-radicalization effort.  By comparing each program in question using 
a framework based on Maslow’s hierarchy, the estimated effectiveness of each program 
can be measured.    
While we agree wholeheartedly with the elements contained within Maslow’s 
Hierarchy of Needs Theory, we believe that when it comes to motivations relating to 
radicalization and de-radicalization these elements do not necessarily follow a hierarchy.  
Our research has pointed to many of the elements contained within Maslow’s theory 
interacting simultaneously versus serially as indicated in Figure 2-6.   
 
 
Figure 2-6. Simultaneous Effects of the Elements of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs 
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For the purposes of this study, we will investigate several countries that have de-
radicalization programs.  Specifically the country’s programs we will analyze include 
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the U.S. Theater Internment Facility (TIF) Program in Iraq.  
This will allow an in depth examination of each level of Maslow’s hierarchy.  These 
cases provide a broad spectrum of cultures and a possibility to discover varied and unique 
methods that satisfy Maslow’s needs.  Analyzing these programs will help determine 
what is effective and what is not effective.  In our examination of each country, we will 
investigate how well the existing program measures up against meeting the demands of 
physiological, safety, social, esteem and self-actualization needs as defined in Maslow.  
In our estimation, a country does not have to fill all of the levels, but at a minimum must 
devote enough attention to overcome the competing radical interest of the detained 
person. By determining what programs are moving in the proper direction, but lacking 
resource, the U.S. may be able to provide additional incentives to aid these programs.  
U.S. support could enable resource deficient programs to meet required levels of 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs based on competing interest. 
Moving forward, the subsequent chapters will analyze through case studies, the 
programs of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and U.S. TIF Program in Iraq. This will be 
accomplished with a discussion of the radical elements within each country, a basic 
description of each countries program and finally an analysis of the country’s program 
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III. A PATH TO RADICALIZATION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
How do radical Islamist groups entice individuals into accepting their agenda and 
eventually playing active parts in furthering the radical Islamist groups’ cause?  This 
chapter will describe several paths to radicalization based on the case studies explored in 
the thesis using the levels of needs found in Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Theory.  
Maslow’s theory provides a foundational understanding of the different paths to 
radicalization.  Understanding these motivations can offer insight into the most effective 
methods to counter these instilled passions, and de-radicalize an individual.   
B. RADICAL GROUP’S SATISFACTION OF PHYSIOLOGICAL NEEDS 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Maslow’s lowest level of needs consists of 
physiological needs.  Catering to these lowest level needs provides the cheapest and most 
efficient way for radical Islamist groups to motivate individuals to join their cause.   
Economic incentives tend to open the door for more radical involvement.26  For example, 
radical Islamist groups, such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq, have effectively used economic 
incentives to entice former Iraqi soldiers, who were out of work, to join their cause of 
Jihad against the United States. An anonymous detainee in an Iraqi detention facility 
made the following statement of why economic incentives are effective, “Uneducated 
people join militias for money; if there were jobs, fewer people would join and this would 
also deter future fighters from turning towards the militias.”27 This detainee was not 
alone; when questioned about their reasons for joining the insurgency 31% cited the 
desire for more money as the primary or secondary motivations.28 Without this economic 
assistance from Al-Qaeda, many of these former soldiers were unable to provide basic 
                                                 
26 Chuck Crossett, Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare Volume II - 1962-2009 (Johns 
Hopkins University: Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory National Security Analysis 
Department [2010]). 
27 Douglas Stone, "Detainee Aspects of Transition" (National Defense University, 2009). 
28 Stone, "Detainee Aspects of Transition." 
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needs of food, water and, in some cases, shelter for their families. The situation in Yemen 
provides yet another example of this approach to radicalization, where recruits were paid 
to join Al-Qaeda Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) cause.29  
Another  example of physiological needs being used as enticement can be found 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where madrassas—religious schools, some of which teach 
radical Islam—fulfill children’s basic needs, including food, shelter and clothing, while 
also providing an Islamic education. In certain situations, families may be sending their 
kids to madrassas as a means of providing the most basic needs for their children; the 
education they are receiving is secondary.   
C. RADICAL GROUPS’ SATISFACTION OF SAFETY NEEDS 
Safety needs make up Maslow’s next level. Radical Islamist groups meet this 
need by, first, focusing on the plight of suffering Muslims worldwide, caused by foreign 
forces such as the United States, and arguing that suffering will continue without 
individual involvement to counter this threat.  As described by a former radical, Maajid 
Nawaz, in a recent interview with CBS’s “60 Minutes,” feeling threatened is expressed in 
the radical elements’ use of the “Narrative,” which claims that, “America is waging a war 
against Islam, invaded Iraq because it hates Muslims, invaded Afghanistan because it 
hates Muslims.”30 The individual perception of vulnerability is caused by perceived 
persecution, thereby driving motivations to join a movement aimed at ending persecution. 
These motivations, in turn, incite acts to overcome these unsafe feelings.  As outlined by 
the National Counterterrorism Center, precipitant feelings of “state violence,” alienation, 
blocked social mobility, racism, humiliation, and/or the recent untimely death of a family 
member, can create a sense of crisis for the individual.31   
Radical groups use several techniques to reinforce a sense of vulnerability in 
individuals. In previously cited cases, individuals who felt relatively safe before 
                                                 
29 Kathy Gannon, "Yemen Employs New Terror Approach," The Washington Post,  July 4, 2007. 
30 Leslie Stahl, "Jihadist and "the Narrative,” 60 Minutes (2010). 
31 Radicalization: Motives, Process, and Possible Disengagement (Washington, D.C.: National 
Counterterrorism Center [2007]). 
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encountering radical groups—once exposed to jihadist videos and religious education—
then felt unsafe and needed the safety of the group.32 Unsafe feelings are grounded in the 
notion that the entire Islamic faith is on the defensive and the individual must “pay now” 
by joining the Jihad or “pay later” in the next life. As bin Laden declared, “If you don’t 
fight you will be punished by God.”33 These recruitment tactics are typically led by 
radical imams, and serve to create more fear and anger in the individual. Within this new 
environmental, isolation from society, extreme peer pressure, sensory overload, sleep 
deprivation, coupled with a constant barrage of “doom and gloom” can provide a feeling 
of insecurity necessary to persuade the individual to move to seek ways to overcome 
his/her safety concerns.34   
These same techniques are described by Omar Nasiri in his book Inside the Jihad: 
My Life with Al Qaeda, A Spy's Story.  As Nasiri outlines, Abu Hamza and Abu Qatada 
who were both radical Islamist Imams at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London during the 
mid 1990’s, used these techniques to convince disenfranchised European Muslims to join 
the global jihad.  Moreover, Omar Nasiri described how Al Qaeda used these same 
techniques to produce tens of thousands of well-trained terrorist at Kalden, Darunta and 
other terrorist training sites in Afghanistan during the 1990s.35   
Once becoming an active member of the radical group, the driving motivation for 
safety is further filled by the perceived protection the group offers from the “state,” and 
even the group itself, as long as the individual element continues to further the group’s 
agenda.  These safety concerns are best summed up by an anonymous Iraqi detainee, 
“Most Al Qaeda members would like to leave the organization, but fear doing so because 
they will be hunted down and will not be accepted back into Iraqi society.”36 
                                                 
32 Omar Nasiri, Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al Qaeda, A Spy's Story (New York, NY: Basic Books, 
2008). 
33 Daniel L. Byman, "Review: Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy?" World 
Politics 56, no. 1 (2003), 139. 
34 Jeffery Bale, Introduction to Terrorism  Lecture Notes, 2010. 
35 Nasiri, Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al Qaeda, A Spy's Story. 
36 Stone, Detainee Aspects of Transition. 
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D. RADICAL GROUPS’ SATISFACTION OF SOCIAL NEEDS 
According to counterterrorism expert Madeline Morris, “If any area of terrorism 
studies can be said to have reached a level of consensus, it is the role of social networks 
in contributing to both recruitment and radicalization.”37  Marc Sageman takes this point 
one step further by arguing, “terrorism is predominantly a social phenomenon: that 
people become terrorists not because they are aggrieved or devout or politically 
conscious, but because, essentially, their friends are doing it.”38   
To truly understand the social element of radicalization, one must understand the 
methods of recruitment that are prevalent among terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda.  A 
RAND study identifies four different methods of recruitment: “The Net,” “The Funnel,”  
“The Infection,” and “The Seed Crystal.”39  The names come from the various shapes as 
depicted in Figures 3-1 to 3-4.  Any effective de-radicalization effort should, at a 
minimum, address the various methods of recruitment, with the goal of being tailored to 
the specific method that resulted in radicalization.   
 
Figure 3-1. The Net40 
                                                 
37 Madeline Morris and others, Deradicalization: A Review of the Literature with Comparison to 
Findings in the Literatures on Deganging and Deprograming (Duke University: Institute for Homeland 
Security Solutions [2010]). 
38 Drake Bennett, "How to Defuse a Human Bomb," The Boston Globe, April 13, 2008. 
39 Sara A. Daly and Scott Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment," in The McGraw-
Hill Homeland Security Handbook, ed. David G. Kamien (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 
2006), 73–88. 
40 Daly and Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment,” 73–78. 
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“The Net” comprises the first recruitment method as depicted in Figure 3-1.  In 
this approach, the radical recruiter casts a wide net of influence across an entire segment 
of the population.  Some of the targeted population will respond positively to the recruiter 
while others will resist his or her efforts.  Daly and Gerwehr argue that the “Net” 
approach is the easiest for a radical organization to use when it is operating in an 
uncontested environment such as Somalia, Yemen, or any other area where the territory 
is largely uncontrolled by a local or federal government, and the majority of the 
population accepts the message of the radical group.41   
 
Figure 3-2. The Funnel42 
The second recruitment type is the funnel. Daly and Gerwehr describe:  
A recruiter may use an incremental or phased approach when he or she 
believes a target population is ripe for recruitment yet requires a 
significant transformation in identity and motivation.43 
As seen in Figure 3-2, the recruitment process begins at one end with those who 
enter either being converted into viable radicals or being rejected back into the 
population.  Just like the process used to transform a raw U.S. military recruit from a 
civilian into a hardened soldier, the radical group uses team building exercises, hazing, 
and other methods to ensure that the individual is committed to their radical agenda.  
                                                 
41 Daly and Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment,” 73–78 
42 Daly and Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment,” 77. 
43 Daly and Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment,” 77. 
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There are many benefits to the “Funnel” method of recruitment.  Primarily, this method 
has been well studied with proven results to affect the psychology of recruits.44  
Secondly, even the recruits who are not accepted can still bear positive effects for the 
radical group by “serving as intermediaries for further recruitment.”45  The “Funnel” is 
the method of choice in areas where the government has some control within its borders, 
but where funneling apparatuses such as radical madarassas are allowed to operate with  
impunity due to either governmental fear of upsetting the population like the Mosque at 
Finsberry Park in London, or in areas like Yemen where the government has little to no 
control.  
 
Figure 3-3. The Infection46 
When a targeted populace is decidedly difficult to influence, a more effective 
method is “The Infection.”47  As depicted in Figure 3-3, just like the spread of a virus in a 
population, some individuals will be immune to the “infection” while others fall victim as 
the radical agents make their way through a targeted population.  This method has the 
advantage of being selective in application and affords the radical group secrecy in a 
contested environment.  States that have a firm control on their population through strong 
security forces are most likely to experience this recruitment method.48  Countries like 
                                                 
44 Daly and Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment,” 77. 
45 Daly and Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment,” 78. 
46 Daly and Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment,” 78. 
47 Daly and Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment," 78. 
48 Daly and Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment,” 78. 
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Kenya or Tanzania provide excellent examples of where the “infection” technique may 
be used against a population that is not necessarily sensitive to radical groups such as Al-
Qaeda’s agenda. Within such a given populace, some disgruntled individuals may be 
vulnerable to being recruited to carry out operations.49 
 
Figure 3-4. The Seed Crystal50 
The fifth pattern that is prevalent among radical recruitment is called “The Seed 
Crystal.”51  As indicated in Figure 3-4 the radical must self-recruit because it is difficult 
to use other methods of recruitment due to tight governmental oversight of radical 
activity.  Once an individual makes the choice to radicalize within the population via self-
recruitment a “seed” is formed. After the seed is formed, the process is similar to “The 
Infection” in spreading to other individuals.  This was the method of recruitment used to 
gain influence in the Hamburg cell that constituted the plotters of the September 11 
attacks.52  
                                                 
49 Daly and Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment,” 79. 
50 Sara A. Daly and Scott Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment," in The McGraw-
Hill Homeland Security Handbook, 79. 
51 Daly and Gerwehr, "Al-Qaida: Terrorist Selection and Recruitment,” 79. 
52 Nasiri, Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al Qaeda, A Spy's Story. 
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Figure 3-5. Social Engagement 
After being recruited, radical groups use a process of social engagement to 
solidify the individual’s ties to the group.  According to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), social engagement is a four-stage process consisting of pre-
radicalization, identification, indoctrination, and finally, action.53 See Figure 3-5. These 
processes are instrumental in turning the raw recruit into a radicalized individual element 
who is willing to give up his or her life for the radical group’s cause. Pre-radicalization is 
the first stage of social engagement, involving a shared belief system such as the Islamic 
faith combined with a feeling of being disenfranchised or dissatisfied with the status quo.  
Radical groups, such as Al Qaeda, use established social institutions like the mosque, 
internet, school, job site, boardinghouses, and prisons to take advantage of existing social 
networks to establish links required for pre-radicalization of individuals who are 
influenced by social motivations.54  Once this condition is established, the stimulus to 
make a change is combined with the opportunity presented by a close friend or relative 
who already has established relations with a radical group.  The individual’s likelihood of 
                                                 
53 The Radicalization Process: From Conversion to Jihad (Washington D.C.: Federal Bureau of 
Investigation [2006]). 
54 Crossett, Casebook on Insurgency 9, 1–619. 
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moving to the next stage of identification is heavily influenced by the power of the social 
bond between him or her, and the friend or family member, who is already a member of 
the radical group.55   
Assuming the individual continues his or her movement toward radicalization, the 
next step is identification with the cause.  In this stage, the individual aligns 
himself/herself with the extremist cause and justifies or encourages violence against the 
existing power structure.56  During this stage, the individual becomes progressively more 
secluded from their former life and social circles.  This separation creates a social 
vacuum filled by other individuals who are either already radicals or within the process of 
becoming radicals.  This new social circle creates a self-reinforcing motivation to become 
even more deeply involved in the radical group’s agenda.  While in this new social circle, 
the individual is typically exposed to more jihadist videos and continued religious 
education by extremist imams.57 This constant barrage of radical ideology associated 
with the identification stage, along with a reinforcing social structure of people with 
common beliefs and goals, propels the individual into the next stage consisting of 
indoctrination. 
As Jessica Stern argues in an interview with the National Public Radio, many 
individuals “get their identities from being part of this exciting, illegal, immoral, and 
violent group.”58  Indoctrination finds the individual fully embracing the radical 
ideology, but unsure of exactly what he/she can do to further the cause.  During this 
stage, the individual is educated by other radical elements as to how to best promote the 
radical agenda by receiving additional training and religious education.  In the interim, 
the individual’s former social relations atrophy as he or she gains more confidence in his 
or her new skills and trusts in the group’s colleagues and beliefs.  At this juncture, the 
individual is ready for the next stage consisting of “action” in support of the cause.59   
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“Action” is the final stage of psycho-social engagement.  This phase does not 
have to be violent, but it is always performed with the intent of damaging the perceived 
enemy.  Some of these actions could include carrying out terrorist acts, facilitating 
operations, recruiting more like-minded individuals, or obtaining financial support for 
continued radical efforts.   This is the defining point for the newly radicalized person’s 
experience with the radical group.  As the radicalized individual progresses higher on the 
ever-narrowing road from recruitment to ideological buy-in, indoctrination, and action, 
they begin to realize that the radical group becomes increasingly consuming, “with no 
exceptions or exits permitted.”60   
The individual may decide to opt out of participation in the activity at any point, 
but he must consider the cost of doing so.  For example, if the individual questions the 
group’s judgment, he or she must consider the wrath of the group.61  Tantamount, at this 
stage, the individual may be seen as a threat to the organization, and may face death for 
not performing the required action.  As Jerrold Post, the founder and former director of 
the Central Intelligence Agency’s Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political 
Behavior, argues: “The way to get rid of doubt is to get rid of doubters.”62 In many cases, 
the vow to carry through with action is cemented with the recording of a “commitment” 
videotape. These tapes serve as an irrevocable contract between the radical group and the 
radicalized individual, who may be asked to carry out a suicide attack as a final act in 
support of the group’s cause.63  Even in the absence of commitment videos, as Martha 
Crenshaw, a pioneer in terrorism studies, states, “Small group dynamics may propel the 
mission beyond any individual's commitment.”64  Upon close consideration, it would 
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seem that the same motivations that work in the U.S. military are “alive and well” with 
radical organizations. According to Dr. Crenshaw, "What keeps them fighting is what 
keeps soldiers in a platoon fighting…they don't want to let their buddies down."65 
E. RADICAL GROUP’S SATISFACTION OF SELF-ESTEEM AND SELF-
ACTUALIZATION NEEDS 
Even the highest levels of needs can be filled by the radical group as the 
individual experiences heightened self-esteem, and in some cases self-actualization.  
Before becoming part of a radical group, the individual typically suffers from low self-
esteem, coupled with a feeling of social impotence.66 These feelings are not in line with 
Islamic societal norms that place great emphasis on personal honor and respect.  Radical 
groups such as al-Qaeda offer examples of martyrs and other heroic figures who have 
earned enormous respect in their neighborhood.  The individual is also exposed to older 
Muslims who offer tales of when they fought in distant lands for the cause of Islam. At 
this point, the many individuals see the only path toward reaching self-esteem and self-
actualization is through joining a radical group such as al-Qaeda in the global jihad.67    
Once part of the radical group, the individual is thrust into participation in a 
“cosmic good versus evil” struggle against the establishment.  The individual is fighting 
on.  In this struggle, many individuals achieve a mantle of self-importance, and self-
worth beyond their wildest dreams. Radical groups, such as al-Qaeda, are also adept at 
using the media to bolster the self-esteem of radicals by widely publicizing successful 
terrorist attacks.68  In some cases, the individual’s photo may be on the FBI or CIA’s 
“most wanted” list with the leader’s names widely recognized across the globe.  As Post 
notes, “Within certain circles, he is lionized as a hero.  He travels first class and his 
family is provided for should his acts of heroism lead to his death as martyr to the 
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cause.”69 For the individual, who came from a position of relative insignificance, the lure 
of achieving these highest levels of self-esteem, and self-actualization, is not easily 
abandoned even by the best de-radicalization effort.   
F. SUMMARY 
Although many other elements may ultimately influence individuals’ decisions to 
radicalize, the elements contained in Maslow’s theory account for the majority of the 
motivations for radicalization.  As noted, the various influences and paths to 
radicalization may deviate from those that are described in this chapter.  However, from 
our research, the influences and paths we have outlined tend to be the most widely 
accepted.  With a firm understanding of how individuals may become radicalized, the 
remaining chapters will outline specific attempts by governments to use the power of the 
same influences to effectively de-radicalize individuals.   
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IV. YEMEN’S RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE COMMITTEE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Yemen, one of the first countries to introduce de-radicalization programs into the 
fight against Islamist movements, is no stranger to violent elements within its population. 
The country has had to contend with Marxist inspired insurgents in the south and 
Islamists propagating a militant interpretation of the faith. Yemen is of particular 
importance to the United States because, beginning in 2008, U.S. born Anwar al Alwaki, 
leader of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), has directed and influenced 
terrorist attacks in the United States.70  One of the most publicized attempts occurred on 
Christmas Day, 2009, when Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian who is suspected to 
have received training and direction in Yemen, attempted to detonate a bomb on a U.S. 
airliner bound for Detroit.71  Even more recently, in May of 2010, Faisal Shahzad, 
influenced by online lectures of al Alwaki, attempted to detonate a car bomb in New 
York City’s Times Square.72  
These recent events represent only a small fraction of Yemen’s radicalism and 
demonstrate the importance of an effective de-radicalization program in Yemen.  
However, an effective program was not the case with Yemen’s Religious Dialogue 
Committee (RDC), which began in 2002 and was terminated in 2005 and is widely 
regarded as a failure.  In order to understand and accurately evaluate Yemen’s de-
radicalization effort, a deeper understanding and a brief history of the radical groups 
within Yemen must first be discussed.  Additionally, in order to understand the 
challenges the programs faced, Yemen’s socio-economic environment needs to be 
considered before closely examining the Religious Dialogue Committee (RDC), which 
headed the de-radicalization program. 
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Radicalism in Yemen can be traced back to the early 1980s, when as many as 
7,000 Yemeni nationals traveled to Afghanistan to join the Beit al Ansar, which later 
became Al Qaeda, and fight against the Soviet Union.  After the Soviet’s defeat in the 
Afghan conflict, the Yemeni government welcomed home its returning jihadis, as well as 
encouraged jihadists from other countries to settle in Yemen.73   
In 1990, North and South Yemen were unified into a republic with deep divides 
between socialists in the south and republicans in the North. The hardened jihadi fighters 
were incorporated into the Northern Yemeni Political Security Organization (PSO) forces 
by President Saleh.  The PSO made many attempts to eradicate the Yemen Socialist Party 
by assassinating several Aden-based politicians aligned with that movement.74 These 
same fighters would then go on to support President Ali Abdullah Saleh in the country’s 
1994 civil war against Southern Yemen’s Socialist attempt at secession.75 Once the 
fighters realized that they were being used by President Saleh and that he had no 
intention of creating an Islamic state, the relationship between the Yemeni government 
and the formerly victorious jihadists quickly dissolved.   
The influx of returning jihadis was also associated with an increase in terrorist 
attacks in Yemen.  In 1992, Al-Qaeda bombed two hotels in Aden where U.S. soldiers en 
route to Somalia were believed to be staying. The attacks resulted in the deaths of two 
tourists.  In 1998, terrorists kidnapped 16 western tourists, resulting in the murder of four 
tourists and the murder of several hostage takers in a failed rescue attempt. Radical 
Islamist-based violence continued to escalate in Yemen when, in 2000, a small group of 
Al-Qaeda supported terrorists attacked the USS Cole in the Aden harbor, killing 17 U.S. 
servicemen.76 Two years later, Al-Qaeda attacked the French vessel, MV Limburg, 
killing one crew member and causing the spill of almost 90,000 tons of crude oil into the 
Gulf of Aden. Because of these events, along with the presence of Al-Qaeda training 
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camps, Yemen has come to be known as a “safe haven for Islamist terrorists”77 and 
considered to be “where extremists come to play.”78  So what makes Yemen such a 
fertile breeding and recruiting ground for Islamist terrorists groups? These questions are 
best answered with a discussion of the socio-economic environment in Yemen. 
Yemen’s has a population of approximately 23 million, with almost 15 million 
under the age 24.  The country’s population continues to grow at a rate of 3% annually, 
one of the highest rates in the world, and is expected to exceed 40 million by 2030.  To 
make matters worse, the country maintains a rampant unemployment rate of 35%, an 
average per capita annual income of $900 (U.S.) and an illiteracy rate over 50%.79 
Combine these dire socio-economic factors and it becomes very clear why Yemen was 
highlighted at number 28 of the 2006 U.N. Human Development Index’s Top 30 “least 
livable” countries.80 In addition to being considered one of the least developed countries 
in the world, Yemen has earned the title of least developed country in the Arab region.81 
Currently the Yemeni government is engaged in three insurgency battles against Houthi 
Shiite rebels in Northern Yemen; secessionists in Southern Yemen; and Al Qaeda 
throughout Yemen, causing grave security and stability concerns. In addition, the 
government lacks credibility with its populace due to massive corruption, hard-line 
crackdowns on terror suspects, and its inability to provide basic necessities such as 
dependable water supplies.82  
B. OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM 
Following the 2001 attack on the USS Cole and the 9/11 attacks, the country 
feared that “the U.S. government would take matters into its own hands to protect its 
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interest.”83 With these concerns in mind, the Yemeni government set out to establish its 
de-radicalization program, the Religious Dialogue Committee (RDC), in 2002.84 
The RDC, which functioned as a means to combat and disengage radical 
ideologies in Yemen was led by former Yemeni Supreme Court Justice Hamoud al-Hitar 
from 2002 until its dissolution in 2005.85 The program did not contain respected religious 
leaders and consisted of only al-Hitar and three ulama.  Many other recognized religious 
figures in Yemen feared joining the dialogue with imprisoned radicals.  Their fear was 
based on previous attempts of similar dialogues in Egypt that resulted in the death of a 
senior cleric.86   
With the exception of the first group of five, the detainees that participated in the 
dialogues were not “among the big ideologues of any Islamist movements.”87 The first 
group of five detainees, however, was, according to al-Hitar, “the most intellectual and 
the most extremist al-Qaeda prisoners.”88 The average participants were age 18 to 40 and 
were generally individuals considered not to have blood on their hands.89 Almost 90% of 
the detainees that participated in the dialogues were born outside of Yemen to Yemeni 
parents.  Most had belonged to radical Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda, al-Jihad, and al-
Hijrah wa-I-Takfir. Additionally, according to various human rights organizations, some 
of the participants were incarcerated not because of actions they had taken, but in order to 
pressure suspected family members and other individuals who were suspected of 
participation in the USS Cole bombing or believed to be affiliated with al-Qaeda.90 The 
ultimate goals of the program were, “the rejection of violence, respect for the rights of  
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non-Muslims (Dhimmi), protection of foreign interests when they were protected by 
treaties or agreements sanctioned by the president (Wali al-Amr) and finally respect for 
the constitution and laws of the country.”91  
With these goals in mind, Hamoud al-Hitar began the sessions with a group of 
five to seven detainees. The dialogues were considered to be an “all or nothing 
endeavor”—either the committee would convince the detainees that their interpretations 
of Islam were incorrect or the detainees would convince the committee that their 
interpretation of Islam was in fact correct. In the later case, the committee would be 
obliged to follow the detainee’s beliefs.92 Before entering into these discussions, both 
parties agreed that the Qur’an and the Sunnah would be the foundation for these 
dialogues and each party would seek truth and respect the other’s opinion.93  
With these ground rules in place, al-Hitar began the discussions by attempting to 
establish the credibility of the Yemeni government by convincing the detainees that the 
Yemen government was legitimate, and the country’s constitution and laws did not 
contradict sharia, (Islamic law). Furthermore, al-Hitar stressed that Yemen’s treaty 
obligations with Western non-Muslim nations, were not un-Islamic. Finally, the RDC 
entered into discussions centered on whether or not the killing of non-Muslims was 
justified.  Each of these issues was discussed at length and the prisoners were given 
ample time to search through the Qur’an and Sunnah to make their case. According to al-
Hitar, most were unable find justification for their reasoning and thus accepted the 
committee’s point of view. Once these fundamental issues of religious interpretation were 
resolved, the dialogues continued and participants were made eligible for the 
government’s amnesty program, if he agreed to sign a pledge renouncing violence. Those 
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in the amnesty program and were required to complete their sentences before being 
released.  It has since been determined that some of these individuals may have actually 
been given amnesty contrary to stated policy.94  
The RDC continued for three years with 364 detainees participating in the 
program and Hamoud al-Hitar claiming “that 98 per cent of graduates from the 
programme have remained non-violent.”95 This statistic remains largely unsubstantiated 
and became even more questionable when, in 2005, two former dialogue participants 
were discovered fighting in Iraq against American forces. More recently, in 2009, an 
additional three Yemeni dialogue participants were part of a suicide attack in Iraq.96 The 
RDC was terminated in 2005 after criticism mounted concerning the effectiveness of the 
program.97  
Throughout the RDC’s three-year history, and since its termination, the Yemeni 
program has continued to receive criticism. Human rights violations, for example, have 
been connected to the program.  According to a Yemeni Parliament report, and confirmed 
by Amnesty International, many of the detainees that participated in the dialogue 
program had been held in prison for over two years without ever being charged or 
allowed to speak to an attorney. Moreover, if the individual’s arrest was not witnessed by 
a family member or friend, it sometimes would take several months for a family to track 
down the individual’s whereabouts.98  Further adding to the long list of human rights 
issues, some participants complained of beatings, torture and other abuses, while many of 
their family members were threatened “if they [the detainees] did not confess to the 
accusations made against them.”99 
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Furthermore, many of the program’s participants felt they were unjustly arrested 
and then forced to participate in the program in order to gain their freedom. Many of 
these untried individuals were arrested following the attacks in on the USS Cole in 2000 
and the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. Once released, the RDC 
participants were promised employment and other assistance that never transpired, 
compromising the legitimacy the Yemeni government gained as part of their program.  
Human rights violation aside, the dialogue program was also criticized for the fact 
that it was never truly a dialogue, “but more to build a platform for a state-monologue 
from where the state could persuade and convert the individuals who held erroneous 
views.”100 The state sought to have the detainees recognize and observe Yemen’s 
constitution and laws as legitimate, while the government failed to recognize this same 
constitution and set of laws.101   
The program’s lack of structure, post-release support, follow-up supervision and 
its failure to address continuing engagement in violence and terrorist activities outside of 
Yemen, combined with the RDC’s blatant human and civil rights violations, ultimately 
lead to the termination of the de-radicalization effort.   
But, to what degree can the program be considered ineffective? 
C. PROGRAM ANALYSIS 
It is our hypothesis that adequately assessing an individual prior to the start of the 
de-radicalization program and properly meeting the individual’s needs throughout the 
program will lead to an effective de-radicalization program.    Using the theoretical 
framework established in Chapter 2 as the basis for evaluation, Yemen’s de-radicalization 
program can now be taken apart and examined to determine in which ways it was 
effective, and where it was not.  
Our analysis starts by examining the first theoretical expectation--the detainee’s 
level of terrorist involvement and level of religious education.  Assessing these two 
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variables is a critical part of an effective de-radicalization program. By understanding an 
individual’s level of involvement, a program can determine to what degree his needs 
must be met in order to de-radicalize him. An individual with a high level of involvement 
within a radical organization is highly indoctrinated to the cause and would require a high 
degree of his needs to be met for there to be any hope of de-radicalization to occur.  
Additionally, assessing the individual’s religious education will also determine 
the level of needs that must be met by the program. Whereas an individual with a low 
level of religious education may have been misguided or mislead, making religious 
reeducation relatively easy, an individual that has a high level of religious education may 
require more sophisticated de-radicalization.    
It appears that the RDC conducted no assessment of the detainee’s involvement in 
the Islamist organization, or his level of religious education. Only the first five 
participants of the program were considered “the most intellectual and the most extremist 
al-Qaeda prisoners.”102 After these first five participants, the level of terrorist 
involvement and religious education appears to have been significantly lower. Taking this 
into account, the average detainee was in the LOW category for level of involvement.  
Similarly the average detainee was also in the LOW category for level of religious 
education. These two factors place the overall category rating at LOW, meaning the RDC 
would have to meet the detainee’s needs at a low degree, giving the program a sufficient 
margin of error. This rating is illustrated in Figure 4-1. 
 
 
Figure 4-1. Religious Education and Level of Terrorist Involvement  
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The second set of variables examined is the environmental and economic 
conditions that the individual will face upon his release. Again, these variables should be 
assessed prior to the individual starting the program. By assessing the environmental 
conditions, and whether the individual’s organization will or will not be active upon his 
release, the program can determine the degree an individual’s needs must be met.  We 
hypothesize that an individual whose organization will still be active upon his release 
would require his needs to be more closely met than an individual that will no longer 
have an organization to pull him back into. An organization still in existence could 
potentially provide for the individual’s physiological and social needs upon release, 
forcing the government to meet and possibly exceed the organizations resources.    
The economic environment the individual is likely to be released into must also 
be assessed. We hypothesize, that an individual facing harsh economic conditions may be 
more likely to fall back to his radical past than an individual released into more 
promising economic conditions. With this in mind, a program would more closely have 
to meet the individual’s economic needs of the detainee returning to a harsh economic 
environment.  By accomplishing this assessment, the program can gauge the likelihood of 
the individual returning to his radical past. 
It can be safely forecasted that Yemen’s economic outlook is poor, falling 
squarely in the BAD category. With limited opportunities for employment in a poor 
economic environment, a detainee may likely return to his radical ways.  Additionally, 
given that the environment in Yemen’s weak political and security environment 
continues to be conducive for radical organizations to develop and sustain themselves, a 
detainee’s organization would still be operating within Yemen upon the individual’s 
release. This would place the detainee in the ORGANIZATION category.  Based on 
these inputs, the average detainee would fall under the HIGH category, meaning that the 
RDC would have to meet a detainee’s needs at a high degree.  This would give the RDC 




Figure 4-2. Environment and Economic Conditions Upon Release 
Taking into account the economic and environmental conditions, we can assign an 
overall requirement of MED/HIGH, meaning that the Yemeni de-radicalization program, 
in order to be effective, would have to meet at a medium to high degree, the detainee’s 
needs.  With this initial assessment complete, the extent to which the individual 
detainee’s needs were met by the competing radical affiliation or by the RDC can now be 
examined.   
As mentioned in Chapter III, radical organizations can fulfill almost every level of 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. In the case of Yemen, radical groups were able to provide 
for the safety and, to some extent, esteem needs of the members. Safety needs were the 
main focus of radical groups and were met by providing financial security by recruiting 
many, “would-be militants” with approximately $1,300 to go to Iraq.103   Additionally, 
many jihadist returning from Afghanistan were received as heroes by the Yemeni 
government and the populace. Finally, members were active participants in a sacred 
battle to defend their faith against infidels. These benefits contributed to radical 
movements indirectly being able to provide for the Esteem needs of potential recruits.104  
D. MASLOW’S FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS 
The RDC’s fulfillment of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs can now be evaluated and 
then compared to those of the competing radical organization. Beginning with Maslow’s 
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initial need, physiological, the Yemen government simply provided the basics.  Prisoners 
were given just enough food and water for basic sustenance while they were detained and 
did not receive any additional amenities. In addition, there have been several reports of 
“blindfolding, solitary confinement in a small cell with very little ventilation and without 
regular access to toilets and drinking water.”105 Failing to provide for the lowest level of 
needs made it extremely difficult for the program to meet any other of the individual’s 
needs throughout the program, undermining the program from the onset. 
Moving to the next need, safety, the RDC clearly falls short of the mark.  In the 
Yemeni program, the prisoners were labeled guilty upon arrival.  As previously 
mentioned, many individuals had been arrested and imprisoned only due to “suspicions” 
of involvement with extremists. Most had not committed any crimes or been formally 
charged with any offenses.106  This arbitrary repression created feelings that detainees 
had been imprisoned unjustly and forced to participate in the de-radicalization program in 
order to obtain their freedom, thus creating the opposite of the safety need, insecurity.  
Adding to these feelings of insecurity, many detainees had complained of beatings by 
their guards, shackling of their hands and legs, and threatening of their family members.  
Again, the RDC did not provide an environment conducive to meeting the detainee’s 
safety needs during and after incarceration.107  
Continuing to the social needs, another missed opportunity for the RDC is 
evident.  No attempt was made to make families part of the process.  This left the 
detainees with a social void during and after the de-radicalization process that potentially 
could be filled by radical elements during incarceration and after release.  At the same 
time, the RDC made no attempt to develop a relationship with the individual. The 
program strictly focused on changing the individual’s internal beliefs and not attempting 
to provide a social network to support these corrected beliefs. Again, the RDC left a 
social void potentially filled by radical elements.   
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After release, little effort was made to reintegrate detainees back into society; the 
Yemeni government, for example, did not provide any social or financial support to 
detainees.  Many of the prisoners were promised employment and other government 
assistance upon release but, in actuality, they received nothing.108  It is not surprising that 
upon completion of the program, the esteem of the individual was not high.  No sense of 
achievement was ever obtained, just a feeling of government oppression and betrayal.   
Another aspect missing from the Yemen program was the inclusion of respected 
religious figures.  The Yemen government claimed its de-radicalization program 
consisted of many respected Islamic scholars, but the head of the dialogue committee, 
Judge al-Hitar was the focus of much criticism.  Judge al-Hitar appeared to be the sole 
public representative of the program and no true cleric took an active role. The absence of 
credible religious scholars is most likely because of fear of retribution and because of 
differences in opinion with al-Hitar.109  Furthermore, Yemen did not include former 
repentant radicals in their de-radicalization effort, which was another missed opportunity 
for the RDC.  Including former radical shows the individual coming full circle and helps 
to attain self-actualization for the reformed radical.  This aspect has proven beneficial in 
the Saudi Arabian program. As shown in Figure 4-3, it is clear that the RDC failed to 
meet the holistic needs of the participating detainees by only meeting the lowest level of 
needs.   
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Figure 4-3. RDC’s Ability to Meet Needs 
The inability of the RDC to meet detainees’ needs alone does not make the 
program ineffective.  However, the fact that the participants were not assessed prior to 
beginning the program on their involvement, education, economic and environmental 
conditions presented problems for measurement of progress.  In addition to not assessing 
the detainee prior to entering the program, the program did not properly meet the 
participant’s needs while in detention and once released, again placing the program in the 
NO category for Properly Met criteria.  Based on these criteria, the RDC would fall under 
the category of LOW EFFECTIVNESS as seen in Figure 4-4. The framework reveals 
where the Yemeni program failed in its efforts to de-radicalize and disengage radical 
Islamist. The Yemeni RDC falls on the low end of the effectiveness spectrum, making it 





Figure 4-4. Program Effectiveness 
Figure 4-5 confirms the ineffectiveness of the program as shown in Figure 4.  
This is illustrated by examining the pre-program assessment of level of involvement and 
religious education of RDC participants determined as being LOW.  At the same time, 
predictive environment and economic conditions upon release were determined as HIGH, 
requiring the RDC to meet a MEDIUM level of needs.  As seen, the RDC failed to meet 
more than the basic of needs, leading the program to being designated as ineffective.   
 
Figure 4-5. Yemen De-radicalization Program Overview 
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V. SAUDI ARABIA’S COUNSELING PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Religious fanaticism and extremism are not new concepts; they have existed since 
the beginning of history.  Recently, however, extremism has reached dangerous new 
levels.  The magnitude of extremism has caused political, social, and economic 
instability, as well as religious turmoil.  Following a series of domestic terrorist attacks, 
Saudi Arabia began a very aggressive and wide-ranging counterterrorism campaign.  In 
addition to efforts to kill and capture terrorists, the campaign now involves countering 
ideological justifications for terrorism within the kingdom.  Rehabilitation and counseling 
programs encourage radicals to renounce their violent ways and attempts to reintegrate 
them back into Saudi society.110   
In 1991, the Saudi government accepted U.S. military support, rather than Osama 
bin Laden’s mujahideen forces to protect against an invasion from Saddam Hussein.  This 
decision created a rift between bin Laden and the Saudi government.  Bin Laden viewed 
the actions as unforgivable and vowed to take down the government.  After the first Gulf 
War, radical Islamists in Saudi Arabia shifted their focus to fighting the growing presence 
of U.S. forces in the Middle East.  U.S. based troops in Saudi Arabia soon inspired 
attacks against the foreign presence.  The Saudi government further became the target of 
radical Islamists who accused leaders of being non-Muslims.  Leaders were perceived as 
religiously and politically corrupt and hypocritical in their religious beliefs and claims to 
be guardian of Islamic holy places.  Radical Islamists felt the government was leading 
Saudi society away from the true practice of the faith of Islam.111  Al-Qaeda also strongly 
opposed the U.S. presence in the kingdom and charged Saudi rulers of betrayal and 
treason.  In 1994, bin Laden was expatriated from Saudi Arabia and left the country.  In 
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early 2002, from his refuge, Osama bin Laden ordered Saudi fighters in Afghanistan to 
return home and start preparing for a campaign in the Arabian Peninsula.112  Jihadists 
who had returned from Afghanistan began to recruit and radicalize Saudi citizens to take 
action against the government.  To justify its violent campaign, Al-Qaeda used the U.S. 
presence in the kingdom and the invasion of Iraq as proof the Saudi government was 
being driven by non-Islamic or Western values.  To fix this problem, Al-Qaeda first had 
to expel the infidels from the Arabian Peninsula and then topple other infidel 
governments in the Muslim world.  A Caliphate would then be restored to rule under 
sacred Islamic law.113    
In 2003, the Saudi Arabian branch of Al-Qaeda launched a series of deadly 
domestic terrorist attacks within Saudi Arabia.  Attacks against foreign interests had been 
occurring since 1995; however, attacks against Saudi interests were new.  Shootouts with 
local police began to increase in frequency, driving the need for a new course of action to 
deal with the new domestic threat.  This created a turning point in Saudi Arabia’s fight 
against terrorism.  Following the attacks, the Saudi government realized that traditional 
security and law enforcement efforts were insufficient and recognized the vital role of 
radical ideology in motivating terrorists.114  To counter this, a new strategy was created 
to combat the ideological justifications for violent radicalism in the kingdom.  The 
counter-radicalization strategy was made up of three components: prevention programs to 
deter people from getting involved with violent extremism; rehabilitation programs 
designed to encourage supporters and sympathizers to renounce violence; and aftercare 
programs to prevent recidivism and to reintegrate people back into society.115  Because 
of its very positive results and success, the Saudi program continues to operate today.    
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B. OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM 
One of the main strategies Saudi Arabia uses to fight radicalism is through 
advocacy and advising.  Based on the realization that only targeting terrorists was unwise 
and counterproductive, the Saudi government adopted a campaign to confront ideas with 
ideas and to attack the appeal of the jihadist ideology by presenting alternative 
interpretations of Islam.116  One of the primary notions of the program is that the 
terrorists are seen as ‘victims,’ whose religious ideas are based on misinformation and 
lack of proper knowledge about Islam.  This assumption makes re-education both 
necessary and possible.  The Saudi government frames the issue by centering on the 
radicals’ lack of authority and understanding of religious doctrine.117  To counter 
ignorance on Islam, the Ministry of the Interior has implemented an intense religious 
reeducation, rehabilitation, and counseling program for jihadi prisoners.  The goal is to 
inspire prisoners to renounce their radical ideology by providing them with psychological 
and sociological counseling and by engaging them in religious dialogue.118   
The de-radicalization program is administered by a group within the Saudi 
Ministry of Interior known as the Advisory Committee.  The committee is composed of 
four subparts: the Religious Subcommittee, the Psychological and Social Subcommittee, 
the Security Subcommittee, and the Media Subcommittee.  Members of each 
subcommittee are located in different districts throughout Saudi Arabia.119 
The Religious Subcommittee is the largest of the four subcommittees.  It is 
comprised of about 150 clerics, scholars and university professors, and is the group that 
directly engages in prisoner dialogues and the counseling process.120   A primary factor 
in selecting scholars is their ability to effectively communicate with prisoners.  
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Successful scholars must be able to speak with the detainee like “his own brother” and 
must be motivated by love, compassion, and a drive to help the prisoner.121  
The Psychological and Social Subcommittee is composed of approximately fifty 
psychologists, psychiatrists, social scientists, and researchers.122 These individuals are 
responsible for assessing and diagnosing prisoner psychological problems and behavior.  
They continually interact with detainees to assess their development and status in the 
program.  Close attention is paid to ensure the prisoner’s rehabilitation is genuine.  The 
subcommittee also facilitates family visits, supplies family housing and transportation 
needs, as well as provides educational opportunities for the prisoner and their family.  
Upon release the subcommittee assists with healthcare and employment demands.123  
The main function of the Security Subcommittee is to evaluate detainees for 
security risks and make release recommendations.124  The subcommittee also provides 
prisoners advice on how to behave upon release so they will not return to jail.  The 
former radicals are reminded that their freedom is dependent on remaining clear from old 
associates and behaviors. Another function of the Security Subcommittee is to monitor 
detainees after their release from prison.  Freed participants are required to check in 
regularly with the subcommittee.125  
The Media Subcommittee focuses on outreach and education.  It produces 
materials used in the program and other educational resources used in Saudi schools and 
mosques.126  The materials target young Saudi males, who are the most vulnerable to 
recruitment by radicals.  Much of the committee’s work is channeled out through 
mosques and events such as lectures and study circles.127  
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Not all captured terrorists are eligible for the de-radicalization program.  
Following incarceration, radical prisoners are placed into one of three categories.  The 
first is for those who planned, facilitated or participated in terrorist acts.  Next are 
sympathizers who did not physically aid terrorists but may have publicly supported them.  
The third category are those who are passive sympathizers and uncooperative with the 
authorities.  These individuals may have provided limited services to terrorists, but only 
because they are believed to have been deceived.128  The entire counseling program, 
including reintegration into society, is only offered to prisoners who have not been 
directly involved in terrorist acts.  However, those who have committed terrorist acts can 
participate in the program but are not eligible for release.  
The initial counseling begins with one-on-one meetings between the prisoner and 
a cleric.  During the first session the cleric clarifies that he is “an independent and 
righteous scholar” and not employed by the Saudi government.129  The Saudi government 
believes that radical ideologies can only be successfully countered by someone not only 
knowledgeable about Islam, but also someone legitimate in the eyes of a radical.   
Therefore, detainees do not meet with religious figures that lack credibility with 
fundamentalists.   
Serving on the Advisory Committee are former militant figures and regime 
critics.130  The initial conversations allow for discussions and dialogue on religion and 
attempt to determine the prisoner’s understanding of Islam.  After this evaluation, an 
explanation of a more mainstream interpretation of the faith is presented.  After 
completing these classes, longer dialogue sessions of six weeks complete the individual’s 
religious re-education.131  Following the completion of the sessions, the prisoner is 
evaluated for release.  Released detainees are initially cared for at a halfway house, where  
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they receive further counseling and are then reintegrated back into society.  The 
government also helps find a job and an apartment, as well as provides a stipend to the 
freed detainee.132  
Since Saudi Arabia’s rehabilitation program was created approximately, 3,000 
prisoners have participated in some part of the counseling program.133  To date, the 
program has produced promising results; Saudi Arabia claims a success rate of 80 to 90 
percent.134  Included in this number are prisoners who refused to participate in the 
program as well as those who failed the program.  According to the Saudi government 
only 35 individuals have been rearrested since their release, which equates to a recidivism 
rate of only 1 to 2 percent.135  The Saudi program is definitely the most expansive and 
best funded counter-radicalization program but is this the only reason for its success? 
C. PROGRAM ANALYSIS 
The theoretical framework established in Chapter II is a useful basis for 
evaluating Saudi Arabia’s de-radicalization program.  The efforts of the Counseling 
Program can now be broken up and examined to determine on which levels it is effective.   
The first theoretical expectation analyzed was a detainee’s level of terrorist 
involvement and level of religious education prior to incarceration.  The Saudi program 
targeted this problem by evaluating each prisoner to determine their level of involvement 
and the role that religious education could play to remedy the problem.  The Saudi 
government determined that 10 percent of the prisoners were hardcore radical Islamists 
with such entrenched beliefs that they could not be reached.136  The rest were seen 
merely as sympathizers and followers that had a low religious education level.  For 
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individuals who might benefit from religious reeducation, the program was offered to 
prisoners not directly involved in terrorist acts.  This can be examined using Figure 5-1. 
 
 
Figure 5-1. Religious Education and Level of Involvement 
The detainees in the program thus had a low level of involvement and a low 
religious education level.  Using these two theoretical expectations we can assign a 
requirement of LOW, meaning that, in order for the Saudi de-radicalization program to 
be successful, it would have to meet at least a low degree of the detainee’s needs.   
The next hypothesis is based on the detainee’s environmental and economic 
conditions once released and whether or not the individual’s organization still existed.  
This can be examined using Figure 5-2. 
 
 
Figure 5-2. Environment vs. Economic Conditions Upon Release. 
 52
Given Saudi Arabia’s oil based economy the individual will face relatively 
favorable economic conditions.  However, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) 
vow to restore the Caliphate and its ability to survive a decade of targeted attacks by 
various governments suggests that the terrorist organization will most likely still be active 
upon the individual’s release. Using Figure 5-2, the environment is “Organization” and 
the economy is “Good.”  Based on these assumptions, the Saudi program must meet a 
MED/HIGH level of the detainee’s needs in order to be effective.  Since the organization 
is still active, it presents a threat to lure the freed detainee back in by providing for the 
needs of the individual.  However, a strong economy also provides for needs not 
addressed in the program and helps keep the individual from needing to rejoin the 
organization.  With this initial assessment complete, the extent the Counseling Program 
meets the detainee’s needs can now be analyzed.   
D. MASLOW’S FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS 
As discussed in Chapter II, Maslow defined the most basic needs of humans as 
physiological needs.  These needs compose the lowest level required for human survival 
and include; breathing, food, sexual activity, and the maintenance of homeostasis.137  
Examining the Saudi program, all of these needs are met and in some cases exceeded.  By 
operating a facility where detainees are afforded individual cells with an adequate supply 
of sleep, food, water, and private excretions, individuals are able to maintain a constant, 
normal state of the body.  The program also addresses the need for sexual activity, as 
sexual frustration has historically been linked to increased radicalization.138  To counter 
this issue, married detainees are allowed conjugal visits.  Health care is also provided to 
both the detainee and his immediate family, which ensures everyone is healthy enough to 
participate in the reeducation process. 
The next element in Maslow’s theory centers on one’s personal safety.   As 
defined by Maslow, the security of the body, employment, resources, morality, family, 
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health and property make up the needs for safety.139  Unsafe prisons precipitate the 
conditions that make prisoners vulnerable to radicalism.  Because of this, the Saudi 
program holds safety in very high regard.  A critical aspect of their program is that the 
detainee is viewed as a victim of perverted interpretations of Islam, rather than as a 
criminal.  Taking this notion a step further, the Saudis segregate men who are a part of 
the de-radicalization process from the regular prisoners and, even more importantly, from 
hard core radicals who are not part of the program.  With these precautions, enrolled 
individuals do not have to fear retribution for taking part in the program.  Furthermore, 
each prison is manned with well-trained staff and all cells are also equipped with security 
cameras to ensure the prisoners do not fear abuse by guards.  Additionally, as detainees 
progress through the Saudi program, they are convinced that an improper understanding 
of Islam is a major safety concern on a spiritual level because they have been running the 
risk of damnation.  Finally, during this entire process the Saudi government is actively 
involved in ensuring the detainee’s family is protected and cared for.   
To fulfill the next level in Maslow’s theory, social needs, the Saudi program 
establishes specific guidelines for family participation in a social context.  According to 
Maslow, social needs involve feelings of belongingness consisting of friendship, family, 
and sexual intimacy.140  Social needs are arguably the most important to fill because they 
form the largest void created by the arrest of the detainee and the subsequent removal of 
the radical social elements that have previously filled his social needs.  In order to meet 
these needs, the Saudi program involves the detainee’s family early on in de-
radicalization efforts.  In the end, the Saudi government holds the detainee’s family 
responsible for the continued good behavior of the released individual. This responsibility 
will give them motivation to continue providing for the detainee’s social needs.   
To ensure the detainee is not overwhelmed upon release, the Saudi government 
continues social support to help former radicals reintegrate back into society.  Assistance 
is provided in locating a job and receiving other benefits such as a car, an apartment, and 
government stipends.  Since the Saudi government treats the former radical as victims  
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instead of criminals, Saudi society is more open to take in the former detainee.  In some 
cases, the Saudi government will help fill a detainee’s social void even further by helping 
the former radical find a wife.141   
An important element of the Saudi de-radicalization program is its focus on self-
esteem.  Understanding reintegration back into society is easier when a detainee can hold 
his head up high with a correct understanding of Islam and jobs skills that will provide 
the former radical with the ability to be a productive member of society.  Establishing 
these feelings is an essential part of ensuring that the program addresses the detainee’s 
need for self-esteem.  As defined by Maslow, esteem presents the normal human desire to 
be accepted and valued by others.142  The rigorous six-week program provides an 
excellent example of addressing the esteem needs.  A religious examination at the end of 
the program provides proof that the former radical sincerely grasps the true principals of 
Islam.   
As important to religious reeducation, the Saudi program recognizes that the old 
job of performing terrorist acts has been replaced by the option for legitimate 
employment.  The Saudis offer a job training course to give needed skills in a trade that 
will allow the former radical to be a successful earner for his family and a productive 
member of society.  By being an effective earner the detainee will have the ability to fill 
his family’s lower needs and in doing so earn their respect.  
The final element in Maslow’s theory consists of ensuring a person is capable of 
meeting their full potential, this is called self-actualization.  As defined by Maslow, self-
actualization means achieving morality, creativity, spontaneity, problem solving, lack of 
prejudice, and acceptance of facts.143  The Saudi program fills this need by ensuring that 
the detainee has a correct understanding of Islam.  More importantly, the former radical 
will be armed with information that will allow him to counter problems created by chance 
encounters with radical elements that would otherwise pull them back into their social 
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circle.  In the government’s interest, the former radical will not hold the same level of 
prejudice against the state since the government has worked extremely diligently to fill 
all of the detainee’s lower needs through the de-radicalization process, producing 
gratitude towards the state.  Additionally, former detainees are also used in the program 
to share the errors of their ways.  This demonstrates to current detainees the moment of 
coming full circle and shows that change is possible and that the change will produce 
positive results. 
Figure 5-3 demonstrates that the Saudi program is able meet the needs of each 
element in Maslow’s theory. 
 
Figure 5-3. Saudi De-radicalization Program’s Ability to Meet Needs 
Figure 5-4 shows the relationship between properly assessing a detainee and 
meeting their needs as well.   
 
 
Figure 5-4. Program Effectiveness 
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In the case of Saudi Arabia, detainees are properly assessed and their needs are 
properly met.  This places the effectiveness of the program as “High.”  
Figure 5-5 summarizes the entire flow of the Saudi program.  Once in the 
program detainees are first properly assessed according to their level of terrorist 
involvement and religious education level. Next, predictions on environmental and 
economic conditions show that the detainee’s terrorist organization most likely will still 
be active upon release, while the economy should be strong.  Finally, each element in 
Maslow’s theory is addressed and all needs are met.  This produces an effective program. 
 
 
Figure 5-5. Saudi De-radicalization Program Overview 
The Saudi government has realized the importance ideology plays in the 
motivation of radical Islamists.  To counter this radical ideology, they have created a 
program that focuses on counseling and reeducation with the goal of rehabilitating 
detainees and reintegrating them back into society.  By properly assessing detainees, 
successfully predicting their environment upon release, and addressing each appropriate 
level of their needs, the Saudi government has produced an overall effective de-
radicalization program.  Conversely, in the next chapter we examine a Yemen, a country 
that did not assess individuals or provide for their needs, resulting in an ineffective de-
radicalization program.   
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VI. U.S. THEATER INTERNMENT FACILITY (TIF) PROGRAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Images often play a prominent role in shaping public perceptions.  This was 
definitely the case during the United States’ invasion of Iraq during the spring of 2003.  
After a quick march into Baghdad, the first image widely celebrated was the toppling of 
the statue of Saddam Hussein.  Not long after came the spectacle of President Bush 
landing on the deck of the USS Lincoln, where he delivered a ‘victory’ speech, with a 
banner behind him proclaiming “Mission Accomplished.”  However, just a year later a 
new set of images surfaced that questioned the fabled representations of the Iraqi 
invasion.  Hundreds of gruesome photographs and videos documenting the torture of 
Iraqi prisoners by American soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison were released.  The bright 
beacon of light that was represented by the United States now grew dim with sadistic 
images of U.S. soldiers mistreating Iraqi prisoners.  Photographs included soldiers giving 
a thumbs-up behind a pyramid of naked detainees, a terrified inmate trying to fend off an 
attack dog, a U.S. soldier grinning next to the body of a dead inmate packed in ice, and a 
hooded inmate standing on a box with his arms outstretched in a Christ-like fashion and 
electric wires attached to his body.144   These images represented the U.S. led detention 
operations and severely damaged U.S. efforts to win Iraqis hearts and minds.  
Additionally, when combined with the questionable operations taking place at the 
Guantanamo Bay detention center, the events provided rich propaganda to radical 
Islamist enemies in Iraq.   
After a thorough investigation by the U.S. military and civilians, it became 
evident that the abuses that took place at Abu Ghraib were extensive, systemic, and part 
of a larger failure that had also taken place at other prisons in both Iraq and Afghanistan, 
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as well as detention efforts at Guantanamo Bay.145   The U.S. Department of Defense 
knew that a drastic overhaul was needed and set about creating a model prison system.      
B. OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM IN IRAQ 
Based on an interview with the architect of U.S. prison reform in Iraq, Major 
General Douglas Stone, and interviews with former U.S. military officers who served as 
detainee guards inside of detention facilities in Iraq, this chapter tells the virtually 
unknown story of how the U.S. military introduced a de-radicalization program in Iraq’s 
and Afghanistan’s detention centers. Eager to move on from the Abu Ghraib prison 
scandal, the United States transferred all its detainees from that facility and turned it back 
over to the Iraqi government in 2006.  The U.S. primarily sent its prisoners to one of two 
main detention centers in Iraq, Camp Cropper or Camp Bucca.  Camp Cropper, which is 
near Baghdad, contained around 3,000 prisoners, including high-value detainees.146  
More moderate individuals were sent to Camp Bucca in southern Iraq, where nearly 
18,000 prisoners were detained.147  In the spring of 2007, Major General Stone was given 
the reigns of Task Force 134.  This task force was responsible for detainee command and 
control, ensuring due process, and assisting Iraq rebuild its judicial, correctional, and law 
enforcement system.148  Immediately after beginning his tour, he outlined a plan not only 
to expand the detention facilities, but also to attempt a large-scale rehabilitation program 
aimed at de-radicalizing prisoners before returning them to their communities. 
Major General Stone continued to pursue an ambitious set of initiatives to 
restructure the system of detention centers in Iraq.  First, once a person was in custody, a 
considerable amount of time was spent learning about them, studying their motivations, 
understanding why they were fighting, and for whom they were fighting.149  The first 72 
hours was an assessment phase, which included multiple evaluations conducted by Iraqis 
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Imams, religious clerics, to determine the prisoner’s religious beliefs.  Furthermore, each 
detainee was assessed to determine what category they would be assigned based on age, 
religious sect, threat level, and insurgent group affiliation.150   
Detainees were also assigned a specific location in the segregation plan.  Prior to 
General Stone’s arrival, moderate and radical Islamist detainees were routinely mixed, 
turning the detention facilities into a “jihadi university.”151  Therefore, one of General 
Stone’s first priorities was to isolate the radical Islamists, who were a minority of the 
population, from the more moderate prisoners.  Once this segregation was complete, an 
attempt could be made to persuade the moderate detainees that their lives would be better 
off if they stayed away from those who preached violent jihad.  
Second, a structured process by which interested detainees could begin a personal 
reform program was set up.  The program provided basic education, vocational training, 
and religious education.  Since approximately 60 percent of the detainees had not 
completed high school, General Stone seized on the opportunity to begin a focused 
education program that included basic education.152  Education was critical to assist 
detainees in the de-radicalization process: they needed to be armed with the ability to 
read and analyze information on their own.  Detainees were provided an education plan 
tailored to their personal needs.  The curriculum was based on a core of six subjects: 
Arabic, English, math, science, civics, and geography.153  Religious courses were also 
offered to give prisoners a chance to study the Qur’an under the tutelage of one of over 
40 clerics working for the program.  Vocational programs were also offered to instill 
employment skills and work habits to provide detainees a better opportunity to reintegrate 
into society.  Lower-risk detainees were allowed to put their skills to use in brick 
factories or textile plants and earn money for their families while they were in prison.154   
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Another important aspect to the program that General Stone emphasized was the 
inclusion of family.  Following Abu Ghraib, the U.S. immediately placed family and 
community involvement as a top priority.  In 2007, then U.S. Central Command 
Commander Admiral William Fallon stated, “The family structures are very strong in this 
country [Iraq].  We want families to be accountable.”155  In Iraq, approximately 85 
percent of U.S.-held detainees were Sunni, but prisoners were held in the Shiite south, far 
from their communities.  Therefore, Admiral Fallon approved a plan to build new 
detention facilities that allowed selected detainees to be closer to home.156  The primary 
means to reach families was through a visitation program that enabled families to remain 
in contact with a detainee.  Engagement with the families was a means to reach the most 
disenfranchised population in the country and to show them the government’s 
commitment to the wellness of its people.    
After Major General Stone took command and revamped detention operations in 
Iraq the results of his programs were positive.  Riots, which once occurred regularly in 
the facilities, vanished.  Violence among the detainees, including beatings and killings, 
went down as well.157 Furthermore, unlike other programs studied, the United States took 
comprehensive biometric information on detainees.  From this information, the U.S. 
military and Iraqi officials could confirm that, of the thousands of prisoners that were 
released from the detention centers, recidivism rates remained astoundingly low, around 
one to two percent.158    
Because of the success in Iraq, the U.S. has tried to incorporate some of the 
successful measures in Iraq into detention facilities in Afghanistan. 
C. OVERVIEW OF PROGRAM IN AFGHANISTAN 
After the U.S. and their allies ousted the Taliban in Afghanistan, they took 
command of a former Soviet airbase in Bagram.  The airfield included a large number of 
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hangars, some of which became a detention facility.  Similar to the facilities at 
Guantanamo Bay, the cells were built of wire mesh and captives shared large open cells 
with other captives.  Each prisoner was only given a blanket and a small mat.  The 
prisoners also shared buckets to use as toilets and did not have access to running 
water.159  However, after lessons learned from operations in Iraq, a new detention facility 
was built at Bagram to address the needs of the Afghan detainee population.  To date, the 
new facility easily holds the nearly 700 detainees, but could hold as many as 1,100 
prisoners.160  The new facility also includes classrooms, vocational training and 
recreational areas, a family visitation center, as well as a fully equipped medical unit.  
The programs of the detention center borrow from practices in Iraq designed to 
rehabilitate detainees by teaching them basic education, moderate Islam, vocation skills, 
and the importance of family involvement.161  The robust academic programs are in tune 
with the Afghan culture and include basic and secondary education.  Local Mullahs 
facilitate discussion of key topics such as prohibitions against violence in the Qur’an, the 
role of prayer and spiritual disciplines, Islamic etiquette, and culturally appropriate civic 
norms.162  The vocational training programs instill employment skill sets and work habits 
to provide detainees with opportunities that will allow them to reintegrate into society.  
Family visitation positively influences villages and tribes by strengthening family ties 
and permitting families to see that detainees are safe.  As in Iraq, the goal is to change 
how the detainees see the world and provide them the skills necessary to become 
functioning members of society. 
The changes brought about by General Stone seem to be making a difference, but 
what is it about these changes that have produced these results?                  
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D. PROGRAM ANALYSIS 
The theoretical framework established in Chapter II is a useful basis for 
evaluating the United States’ de-radicalization programs inside of Theater Internment 
Facilities (TIF) in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The efforts inside of the TIF can now be broken 
up and examined to determine on which levels it is effective.  The programs inside Iraq 
and Afghanistan are nearly identical, which produces the same results when examining 
the first set of intervening variables.  However, the second set of environmental 
intervening variables alters the outcomes slightly.  Therefore, when the second set is 
examined, each program is analyzed separately, isolating the conditions inside each 
country.  
The first theoretical expectation analyzed was a detainee’s level of terrorist 
involvement and level of religious education.  Each program targeted this problem by 
evaluating prisoners to determine their level of involvement and the role that religious 
education could offer to solve the problem.  In Iraq and Afghanistan, detainees are put 
through multiple levels of assessments to determine where in the camp they should be 
housed.  Hardcore radicals are separated from the rest of the more moderate prison 
population.  Furthermore, only the moderates are able to participate in the program.  
Also, religious education levels of detainees are low in both locations, with data 
suggesting that 70 percent of detainees do not attend mosque on a regular basis.163  This 
dynamic can be examined using Figure 6-1.   
 
Figure 6-1. Religious Education and Level of Terrorist Involvement 
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The detainees in the program thus had a low level of involvement and a low 
religious education level.  Using these two theoretical expectations we can assign a 
requirement of LOW, meaning that in order for the programs in Iraq and Afghanistan to 
be successful, it would have to meet at least a low degree of the detainee’s needs. 
The next hypothesis is based on the detainee’s environmental and economic 
conditions once released and whether or not the individual’s organization still existed.  
The case of Iraq can be examined using Figure 6-2.  
  
 
Figure 6-2. Environment and Economic Conditions in Iraq Upon Release 
Iraq’s unemployment has stabilized at around 15 percent, down 44 percent since 
2007.164  Given this trend and Iraq’s oil based economy, the individual should encounter 
somewhat favorable economic conditions.  However, with the continued presence of AQI 
(Al Qaeda in Iraq), the terrorist organization will most likely still be active upon the 
individual’s release.  Using Figure 6-2, the environment is “Organization” and the 
economy is “Good.”  Based on these assumptions, the Iraqi program must meet a 
MED/HIGH level of the detainee’s needs in order to be effective.  If an organization is 
still active, it poses a threat to lure the released individual back in by providing for the 
needs of the individual.  However, a stronger economy also provides for needs not 
addressed in the program and shields the individual from the need to rejoin the 
organization.  Next, Afghanistan is examined using Figure 6-3. 
                                                 





Figure 6-3. Environment and Economic Condition in Afghanistan Upon Release 
The major difference with Afghanistan is that it does not provide a sustainable 
economy.  Afghanistan’s unemployment rate is currently 35 percent, more than double of 
Iraq’s, and is not forecasted to improve in the near future.165  Compounding the problem, 
the Taliban and Al Qaeda will most likely still be active upon the detainee’s release.  
Using Figure 6-3, the projected environment is “Organization” and the economy is 
“Bad.”  Based on this, the Afghan program must meet a HIGH level of the detainee’s 
needs in order to be effective.  Because the poor economy will not provide for any 
additional needs, the de-radicalization program must ensure that when the individual is 
released, they are equipped with the proper tools to maintain an honest lifestyle.  With 
this initial assessment complete, the extent the de-radicalization programs in Iraq and 
Afghanistan meet the detainee’s needs can now be analyzed. 
E. MASLOW’S FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS 
The most basic element in Maslow’s needs theory focuses on physiological needs.  
Physiological needs compose the lowest level required for human survival and include 
breathing, food, sexual activity, and the maintenance of homeostasis.166  In analyzing the 
U.S. detention facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan post 2006, it is evident that sufficient 
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attention was given to prisoner’s physiological needs.  In Iraq, prisoners were moved 
from open area overcrowded cells and were kept in Modular Detainee Housing Units 
(MDHU).  Approximately six inmates shared a separate housing unit that was equipped 
with a bathroom.  Similarly, the new detention facility in Afghanistan contains private 
cells with their own beds and no longer requires prisoners to use a bucket for a toilet: the 
new bathrooms now include modern toilets and plumbing.  Addressing each of these 
physiological needs allows the detainee to maintain a proper homeostasis and stay 
engaged in the de-radicalization program. 
Personal safety is the next element in Maslow’s theory.  Again, safety involves 
the security of the body, health, employment, resources, morality, and family.167  Prisons 
are often associated with violent extremism and are often hotbeds of terrorism.  American 
criminologist Harvey Kushner argues that prisons are one of the main recruitment 
grounds for Al-Qaeda.168  To help counter this and to promote a safer environment in the 
detention facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan, hard core radical Islamists are segregated 
from the rest of the more moderate prison population.  The aim of the segregation is to 
minimize detainee networking, which leads to less chance of rioting or violent behavior 
instigating trouble in the camp.  By breaking up big corrals of hundreds of people, it 
makes the facility more secure.  Additionally, training and educating the frontline staff is 
a top priority.  Prison staffs are taught to ensure that detainees are treated humanely at all 
times.  The International Red Cross (IRC) and Human Rights Watch also provide 
oversight on prisoner safety.  After General Stone turned around the Iraqi and Afghan 
detention facilities, he ushered in a new era of openness and transparency.  The IRC and 
Human Rights Watch provide oversight on prisoner safety.  The IRC and Human Rights 
Watch often visit detainees to evaluate the treatment they receive while in custody.  
Furthermore, detainees are provided the same healthcare, and are seen by the same 
doctors, at the same facility as the guard personnel.169  In fact, some of the detainees felt  
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safer in the detention facility than they did back at home and, occasionally, an individual 
eligible for release requested to remain in detention to  continue receiving the benefits 
and safety the facility offers.170 
The next element in Maslow’s theory involves social needs.  Maslow defines 
social needs primarily as feelings of belongingness consisting of friendship and 
family.171  Addressing these needs is a central focus of the programs inside of Iraq’s and 
Afghanistan’s detention facilities.  As discussed in Chapter III, violent Islamists recruit 
prisoners by isolating them from their families, communities, and government.  To 
counter this, the U.S. placed family and community involvement as a top concern.  New 
family visitation centers were built at existing detention facilities to allow prisoners to 
remain connected and keep familial bonds strong.  Also, because families of detainees 
have lost a primary wage earner, they often are destitute.  As mentioned earlier, the 
detention facilities allow some of the low-risk detainees the privilege of venturing outside 
of the camp gates daily to work in brick factories or textile plants in order to earn money 
for their families.172  Additionally, families are prepared for the reintegration of their 
detainee and gain an appreciation for their perspectives as a result of journeying with 
them through the process of de-radicalization.  These same social bonds with the family 
and community are also used to ensure that once released the individual remains 
monitored and does not return to their radical ways. 
The next element in Maslow’s theory is self-esteem.  Maslow defines this as the 
normal human desire to be accepted and valued by others.173  A cornerstone of the 
programs in U.S. detention facilities is rehabilitation.  The program stresses preparing 
prisoners for their release and facilitating their transition back into society so that they 
will be less vulnerable to once again conducting radical activities.  Detainee initiatives 
totaling more than $250 million, including education, religious studies, and vocational 
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training have been instituted throughout the facilities.  Civics courses cover “why you 
should get an education” and “why you should try to have a job.”174  Other courses 
include how to control anger, the oath of peace, and the sacredness of life and prosperity.  
One of the goals of this education is to shift the institutional experience from retribution 
to rehabilitation.  It also enables the detainees to achieve their full potential and gives 
them the power to have a better future.175  Religious courses taught by one of nearly 50 
local Imams in the program empower detainees to understand more accepted 
interpretations of the Qur’an and allow them to question violent radical ideology.  
Religious education classes increase individual awareness and moderation and strive to 
demonstrate that knowledge is the path to enlightenment.176  Vocational training provides 
detainees the necessary skills for career employment opportunities and thus enhances 
reintegration and reduces recidivism.  General Stone states, “What we’re trying to do, 
obviously, is impress upon the [detained] population that there is a mechanism by which 
their behavior and the things they do can influence their release and can influence the 
society.”177  
The last element in Maslow’s theory is self-actualization.  Maslow defined this as 
achieving morality, creativity, spontaneity, problem solving, lack of prejudice, and 
acceptance of facts.178  Programs in U.S. detention facilities fill this need by allowing 
detainees to study the Qur’an under the tutelage of moderate clerics.  The objective is 
aimed at producing “religious enlightenment.”  The exposure to what is actually 
contained in the Qur’an allows detainees to reject radical interpretations of Islam.  
Additionally, armed with education and the correct interpretation of Islam, the individual 
can take on the responsibility of influencing others not to follow violent radical ideology.  
Figure 6-4 demonstrates that the U.S. efforts at de-radicalization programs in Iraq 
and Afghanistan are able meet the needs of each element in Maslow’s theory. 
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Figure 6-4. U.S. Run De-radicalization Programs Ability to Meet Needs 
Figure 6-5 shows the relationship between properly assessing a detainee and 
meeting their needs as well.   
 
 
Figure 6-5. Program Effectiveness 
In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, detainees are properly assessed and their 
needs are properly met.  This places the effectiveness of the program as “High.”  
Figure 6-6 summarizes the entire flow of the U.S. programs.  Once in the program 
detainees are first properly assessed according to their level of terrorist involvement and 
religious education level. Next, predictions on environmental and economic conditions 
show that the detainee’s terrorist organization most likely will still be active upon release, 
while the economy should be strong.  Finally, each element in Maslow’s theory is 
addressed and all needs are met.  This produces an effective program. 
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Figure 6-6. U.S. De-radicalization Programs Overview 
Following a rough start and after suffering a black eye from early efforts at 
detention in Iraq, the U.S. quickly searched for a new model to handle detained prisoners.  
As the commander of Task Force 134 General Douglas Stone created a new system that 
changed detention to rehabilitation.  The program focuses on reeducating individuals and 
giving them a set of marketable skills that will enable them to reintegrate into society.  
By properly assessing detainees, successfully predicting their environment upon release, 
and then addressing each appropriate level of their needs, an overall effective de-
radicalization program was produced.  The final chapter in this thesis offers implications 
of these findings and proposes a way ahead for the future of de-radicalization efforts.    
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VII. CONCLUSION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The programs we have examined in this thesis were intended to disengage, 
reeducate, and de-radicalize extremists.  Despite the purported success of many 
programs, little systematic analysis exists on de-radicalization as an effort to end radical 
Islamist motivated terrorism. The de-radicalization programs we examined are 
descriptively rich but lack empirical data to each program’s effectiveness.  There is also 
no standard of measurement to apply across specific countries’ programs.  This thesis has 
aimed to fill this gap by providing a basic framework to analyze and compare de-
radicalization programs.179  Specifically, it used Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Theory to 
evaluate the different paths to radicalization and the requirement for programs to 
effectively meet the same needs of detainees and counter the desire to return to 
radicalism.    
What can the United States government and military learn from these programs? 
“Why are there different degrees of effectiveness among de-radicalization programs?” 
B. FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS 
Our framework was based, loosely, on Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. The 
components of Maslow’s theory include physiological, safety, social, self-esteem, and 
self-actualization needs.  Our examination of three case studies demonstrated how each 
of these individual components was effectively or ineffectively applied in de-
radicalization efforts in the countries we examined.  The research found that a proper 
assessment of an individual’s needs and an understanding of the environment they will 
return to upon release, coupled with a program capable of providing for those needs, 
determine the effectiveness of a de-radicalization effort.    
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Building off of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs theory, our research reveals several 
key factors that are important for understanding individual motivations for joining and 
leaving terrorists groups.  The first factor was the level of involvement of a terrorist.  Was 
the terrorist a lower echelon participant, a key planner/organizer for the cause, or did the 
individual actually have blood on their hands?  The second factor evaluated was the 
detainee’s religious education level.  Was the detainee religiously illiterate and dependent 
on others for their interpretation of Islam, a well-educated religious scholar, or maybe 
somewhere in between these two extremes? The third factor, the economic conditions 
that detainees might face upon release, played a critical role in countering Islamic 
radicalism. Will the economy allow the individual to use the skills and knowledge gained 
during the de-radicalization process to make a new life, or will he return to 
unemployment? Finally, the likelihood of the terrorist organization’s persistence was 
considered.  If the group still exists, the government will have to fill the social void that 
may draw the individual back to the organization once released. 
Our research also found that the sponsor of the de-radicalization program, which 
is usually a country’s government, must effectively evaluate the individual based on these 
variables along with assessing of his motivations for joining the radical element in the 
first place.  A comprehensive evaluation determines to what degree a de-radicalization 
program must operate in order to overcome competing radical interests.  If an adequate 
number of these competing needs are not able to be met by the existing program, the best 
option may be to keep an individual detained until some of the external variables change 
or the program gains additional resource to better compete with the radical organization.   
C. FINDINGS 
Several findings emerged from this research, including the importance of 
assessment, the need for segregating prisoners in detention centers, and a focus on 
rehabilitation versus retribution.  First and foremost, an assessment is important in 
creating a successful de-radicalization effort.  An effective program cannot be developed 
without knowing the individual and the social, religious, and economic environment the 
program will be up against.  As discussed in Chapter IV, Yemen did not have an 
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assessment program.  This lack of assessment led to many extreme radicals participating 
in the program who should have been excluded.  The lack of assessment created a major 
stumbling block for Yemen’s efforts when combined with their limited resources.  In 
contrast, the Saudi and U.S. programs had an extensive assessment effort, as discussed in 
Chapter V and Chapter VI.  The assessment process enabled these programs to better 
focus their resources on individuals who could be de-radicalized while screening out 
those who could not be de-radicalized under current conditions. 
Second, proper assessment allowed for effective segregation of those who were 
hardcore radicals from those who were more moderate. Segregation minimizes detainee 
networking and further recruitment and radicalization. Additionally, segregation has been 
proven to reduce violent behavior in detention centers such as rioting.  Segregation also 
prevents detainees from being exposed to retribution for taking part in the program 
thereby, creating a safer environment.  Finally, segregation allows for the separation of 
different ethnic groups that may be in turmoil with one another, thereby further 
improving the safety of the detention facility.  In both Yemen and the pre-General Stone 
U.S. detention program in Iraq, the environment was unsafe and provided the potential 
for radical individuals to recruit more moderate detainees.   Conversely, the Saudi 
program immediately implemented segregation to ensure that more radical elements were 
not able to influence others in the program, and were able to create a safer environment 
for participants to flourish.  Once taking over the detention centers in Iraq, Major General 
Stone segregated the radicals from the moderates and ethnic groups in turmoil with 
similar success to the Saudi program. 
Moving into the core of the de-radicalization process, a focus on rehabilitation 
rather than retribution was important for lasting success of the programs studied.  In 
conventional battles, captured combatants are removed from the battlefield and held until 
the end of the conflict.  However, in ideological warfare, the battlefield is in the mind of 
the individual and there is no easily determined end of hostilities.  Furthermore, the goal 
of de-radicalization programs is to eventually reintegrate the individual back into society. 
The most effective way to accomplish this goal is to promote rehabilitation rather than 
retribution.  Our research showed that rehabilitation is best accomplished through the 
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inclusion of family, education, vocational training, and by providing an alternative way 
of life.  The Saudi program and the U.S. program in Iraq confirmed the value of 
rehabilitation in their de-radicalization efforts by including religious and basic education 
courses to ensure that the individuals had a better understanding of their religion.  This 
increased religious understanding should prevent them from being persuaded to perform 
actions that were in conflict with religious scriptures once released. Additionally, job 
training provided marketable skills that enabled an individual to be a better provider for 
their family once reintegrated back into society. Finally, the strengthening of family 
bonds while the individual was in the de-radicalization program served two purposes.  
First, it ensured that the individual would have a strong social circle to replace the radical 
social influences.  Secondly, it included the family in the de-radicalization effort. The 
family was also influenced by the positive aspects of the program, thereby widening the 
de-radicalization programs effects.    
D. IMPLICATIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
From the results of our research, two implications are evident.  First, the need for 
a framework by which to evaluate and compare de-radicalization programs and reliable 
data are essential for understanding the success of de-radicalization efforts. The 
framework proposed in this thesis is a useful starting point for U.S. efforts to assist other 
countries in their de-radicalization efforts.   For example, in Yemen, the U.S. could have 
offered insight into the importance of assessment thereby allowing the Yemini 
government to better identify individuals who were not suitable for the program.  This 
simple act would have saved time, money and effort.  Additionally, the U.S. government 
could help other countries identify missing resources that prevent successful 
rehabilitation and reintegration of suitable individuals.  The U.S. government could also 
supplement programs such as the one in Yemen with additional funding and expertise to 
offset the extremely challenging environment. 
Second, the U.S. can continue to develop effective de-radicalization efforts and 
avoid costly failures that will help prevent further acts of terror.   For example, the U.S. 
never instituted a de-radicalization program for terror suspects at Guantanamo Bay; it 
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was constructed to keep dangerous enemy combatants off of the battlefield with no 
efforts to de-radicalize them.180  The shortsightedness of the Guantanamo effort is best 
summed up by a report from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency; it states that at least 
sixty-one of individuals released from Guantanamo returned to practicing terrorism.181  
Furthermore, the Saudi Ministry of Interior recently announced that eleven former 
Guantanamo detainees are on the Saudi government’s most wanted list for terrorism.182   
Finally, several areas for additional research have emerged from this study. First, 
what are the current U.S. and international laws that need to be modified to support 
detention and de-radicalization as part of its overseas operations?  Second, how can the 
U.S. lawfully implement de-radicalization programs in U.S. prisons?  Finally, but perhaps 
most critically, how can the U.S. encourage the moderate Ummah to engage radical 
Islam? Future researchers, hopefully, can identify the missing pieces of the puzzle needed 
to defeat a virulent radical Islamist ideology that continues to undermine stability 
throughout the world.  
Unfortunately, the battle against radical extremists is not going to be won quickly 
or purely by military means alone.  The heuristic framework in this thesis helps delineate 
the keys to a successful de-radicalization program.  In addition, by addressing each 
individual’s circumstances that shape their motivations, an effective program can be 
tailored to meet the individual’s needs.  By utilizing the knowledge of what defines an 
effective de-radicalization effort, the United States and its allies will have another means 
to combat radical Islam and prevent further acts of terror. 
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